# 1NC

### Da 1

#### A) Obama winning but the race is tightening

Silver 10-31 (Nate Silver 10-31-12, New York Times, Oct. 30: What State Polls Suggest About the National Popular Vote, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/oct-30-what-state-polls-suggest-about-the-national-popular-vote/>, jj)

Mr. Obama made gains in the FiveThirtyEight forecast on Tuesday, with his chances of winning the Electoral College increasing to 77.4 percent.

A fair amount of this boils down to Ohio, where three polls released on Tuesday gave Mr. Obama leads by margins ranging from three to five percentage points. Two of the polls, from Grove Research and the Mellman Group, generally show strong results for Democrats, which give them less impact in the forecast after applying our adjustment for pollster “house effects”. Still, the three polls taken collectively were enough to widen Mr. Obama’s projected lead in Ohio to 2.4 percentage points from 2.1 on Monday. Given how central Ohio is to each candidate’s electoral strategy — and how little time remains in the race — this was enough to improve Mr. Obama’s Electoral College chances. (The forecast does not yet account for the poll by Quinnipiac University for The New York Times and CBS News, which had Mr. Obama five points ahead in Ohio but which was released after we had run the model for the night.)

Another poll that received a lot of attention on Tuesday was one by Glangariff Group Inc. in Michigan, for The Detroit News. That survey had Mr. Obama ahead by only 2.7 points in Michigan.

There has been some odd polling in Michigan this year, but the Detroit News polls have not been a big part of the problem. Instead, its surveys have usually come pretty close to the polling consensus in the state. Furthermore, this survey suggests tightening in the race in Michigan since earlier this month, when a poll by the same firm had Mr. Obama ahead by 6.7 percentage points instead.

Nonetheless, Michigan is probably not as close as two or three points right now: most polls released after the first debate in Denver suggested a lead for Mr. Obama in the mid-to-high single digits. Usually, states do not shift all that much relative to others in their region. The fact that Mr. Obama’s polling has held up reasonably well in Ohio and Iowa, for example, is reason to suspect that some of the movement in the poll represents statistical noise, even if it comes from a good polling company.

Perhaps more important, we’re at the stage in the race where getting a relatively good poll does not matter all that much: the question is which candidate is ahead outright in enough states to secure 270 electoral votes. Michigan deserves to be monitored over the final week of the campaign, but in all probability Mr. Romney’s more likely paths to victory will run through Ohio instead.

Mr. Obama had a somewhat above-average day in national polls on Tuesday, which had him up in the race by about one percentage point on average. Part of this is because the Gallup poll, which has shown very poor results for Mr. Obama, did not publish results on account of Hurricane Sandy.

Perhaps the most intriguing result from this group is the poll from Google Consumer Surveys. (Yes, Google has begin to conduct surveys online.) That poll had Mr. Obama ahead by four percentage points, an improvement from a roughly 1-point deficit for Mr. Obama in their prior survey last week.

The Google survey could be an indication that the effects of the hurricane will play somewhat to Mr. Obama’s political advantage. But it will probably be Thursday or Friday, once power and some of the national tracking surveys that have been discontinued have come back online, before we can say so with much confidence.

In the meantime, the state polls continue to hint that Mr. Obama remains the favorite to win the Electoral College — and if the state polls are right, he may well be the favorite in the popular vote as well.

***B) Link --- plan drives a wedge into Obama’s base --- they’re key to re-election***

**Mick ‘10**

Jason Mick, 6-19-10, Daily Tech, Obama Fights For Nuclear, Environmentalists Label Him a Shill <http://www.dailytech.com/Obama+Fights+For+Nuclear+Environmentalists+Label+Him+a+Shill/article18781.htm>, jj

Despite these small victories, President **Obama's nuclear vision faces many impending obstacles**. Despite the fact that you could tear down one of the nation's old reactors, replace it with a dozen modern clean reactor designs and still have less net waste, some **environmentalist groups remain adamantly opposed to new plant construction.** **They have vowed to bury the bid for clean nuclear power under a flood of lawsuits. If the suits succeed, they will raise the cost of nuclear so high, that it can't even compete with the most expensive forms of nuclear energy, like solar power.** And perhaps **the biggest obstacle to Obama's nuclear vision will come in 2012**. That is the year when he will face reelection. **That may prove challenging given that** one of **his** former **key constituent groups -- the environmental lobby -- has become one of his staunchest critics**. Regardless, the U.S. is making its first true nuclear progress in 30 years, and that is among the many factors that will already make President Obama's presidency noteworthy.

***Obama’s margin for error is small --- plan deflates democrat enthusiasm***

**TNF ‘12**

1-3, The New Fuelist, Obama’s tall environmental task in 2012 <http://www.newfuelist.com/blog/obama-coal-regulations-keystone-pipeline>, jj

In case you can’t see it, **that’s a treacherous tightrope Barack Obama is walking on these days whenever he steps into the circus-like national energy and environmental policy debate. And his margin for political error on environmental issues will shrink even more during this election year. To avoid alienating environmentalists who supported him in 2008, he must not forget to occasionally—and substantially—lean to the left.** But if he wants to hold on to coveted independent voters who are more worried about the slumping economy than they are about pollution, he must also periodically shift back to the middle and right.The proposed Keystone XL pipeline embodies the President’s conundrum. From the right, calls for increased “energy security” and for the creation of (a disputed number) of pipeline-related jobs make it hard for him to say no. On the left, a large and organized anti-pipeline contingent has taken pains to turn the decision on the pipeline—which will carry crude made from Canadian oil sands, the extraction and production of which makes the fuel much more greenhouse gas-intense than conventional oil—into a political make-or-break for Obama on climate change. The administration spent 2011 establishing what it must view as a politically necessary middle ground on the environment. It engineered a drastic ratcheting up of fuel efficiency standards for automakers, and sold it as a way to both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the burden on the consumer. It also introduced landmark regulations on air pollution from power plants, while placating utilities—and outraging many supporters—by delaying the EPA’s proposed tightening of the nation’s standards for smog. And it earned at least temporary relief from pressure to decide on the Keystone XL by punting the issue past the election, to 2013. But **it’s going to be tougher to maintain balance on the tightrope this year.** Congressional Republicans, by demanding a much-earlier Obama decision on the Keystone XL in exchange for their support of the recent payroll tax extension, have hinted at their party’s desire to force the President’s hand on environmental issues. **The GOP’s presidential nominee will undoubtedly attempt to paint Obama as an over-regulator and irrational environmentalist—an attack line which will warrant a defense. And therein lies Obama’s tall task:** to defend his administration’s substantial forays into environmental regulation in terms that resonate with independents whose main concern is the economy—all while simultaneously **ensuring that his frustrated environmentalist supporters don’t completely lose their patience**.

***C) Romney attacks Iran***

**Wickham** 12-19-**11** (DeWayne Wickham is a columnist for USA Today, Iraq War is over; will GOP replace it with Iran?

<http://www.statesmanjournal.com/article/20111220/OPINION/112200303/Iraq-War-over-will-GOP-replace-Iran->, jj)

On the day the Iraq War officially ended, **seven Republicans who are champing at the bit to be their party's standard bearer in next year's presidential race were** on a stage in Sioux City, Iowa, **debating the possibility of Iran joining the world's nuclear weapons club**. And **all but one of them** — in that setting, or on other recent campaign stages — **threatened to launch a new Middle East war to keep that Islamic republic from becoming a nuclear power. Only** Rep. Ron **Paul**, R-Texas, **a long shot to win the GOP nomination**, **sounds like an adult when it comes to Iran. Iran is destined to become a nuclear state**. While that's not a thought I relish, it's a reality the pragmatists in the bowels of the U.S. government surely understand. **If Iran hadn't made an irreversible decision to obtain nuclear weapons before an American-backed NATO force helped Libyan rebels topple Moammar Gadhafi, it must have done so after he was chased from power and summarily executed**. **The government in Tehran**, which has threatened the annihilation of Israel, **knows it could end up like Gadhafi's regime without the protection that a nuclear arsenal would give it**. **Indeed, even the world's most erratic states like North Korea understand the relative defensive comfort that even a few nuclear weapons assures**. Iranian leaders understand this, too. **They know their survival depends on their ability to ward off a foreign-assisted regime change attack from within, or a direct assault from an outside force, like the U.S. invasion of Iraq. And a nuclear bomb will give them that blocking power.** **To say, as** even President **Obama does, that no options have been taken off the table is one thing. To publicly proclaim a determination to make war on Iran to keep it from getting a nuclear weapon is an unequivocal commitment to a new and more costly Middle East conflict**. In nearly nine years of fighting, the Iraqi War took the lives of 4,487 American men and women, and wounded 32,226. While nothing approaches the human toll wrought by that war, **the financial cost — approximately $800 billion — has taken a big bite out of our national treasury. If one of the hawkish Republican contenders becomes president, the human and financial costs of the war they've threatened to launch against Iran will pale in comparison with the price we paid in Iraq**. **The Republican hawks**, no doubt, **will argue this is a cost we must pay to stop Iran from using a nuclear weapon against Israel — our most reliable ally in the region**. But unless Iranian leaders want to turn their entire nation into a suicide bomber, they won't risk the nuclear retaliation Israel would rain down upon them at the first sign of an Iranian nuclear-tipped missile heading toward the Jewish state.

***Iran attack will cause a global nuclear war that leads to human extinction***

**Hirsch** Professor at the University of Califorina at San Diego 20**08**

(Seymour Hirsch, Professor of physics @ the University of California @ San Diego, 4/10/2k8 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=HIR20060422&articleId=2317)

**Iran is likely to respond to any US attack using its considerable missile arsenal against US forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf**. Israel may attempt to stay out of the conflict, **it is not clear whether Iran would target Israel in a retaliatory strike but it is certainly possible. If the US attack includes nuclear weapons use against Iranian facilities,** as I believe is very likely, rather than deterring **Iran it will cause a much more violent response. Iranian military forces and militias are likely to storm into southern Iraq and the US may be forced to use nuclear weapons against them, causing large scale casualties and inflaming the Muslim world. There could be popular uprisings in other countries in the region like Pakistan, and of course a Shiite uprising in Iraq against American occupiers.** Finally I would like to discuss the grave consequences to America and the world if the US uses nuclear weapons against Iran. First, **the likelihood of terrorist attacks against Americans both on American soil and abroad will be enormously enhanced after these events. And terrorist's attempts to get hold of "loose nukes" and use them against Americans will be enormously incentivized after the US used nuclear weapons against Iran. , it will destroy America's position as the leader of the free world. The rest of the world rightly recognizes that nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from all other weapons, and that there is no sharp distinction between small and large nuclear weapons, or between nuclear weapons targeting facilities versus those targeting armies or civilians.** It will not condone the breaking of the nuclear taboo in an unprovoked war of aggression against a non-nuclear country, and the US will become a pariah state. **Third, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will cease to exist, and many of its 182 non-nuclear-weapon-country signatories will strive to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent to an attack by a nuclear nation. With no longer a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, any regional conflict may go nuclear and expand into global nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are million-fold more powerful than any other weapon, and the existing nuclear arsenals can obliterate humanity many times over. In the past, global conflicts terminated when one side prevailed. In the next global conflict we will all be gone before anybody has prevailed.**

### DA 2

#### Next is public backlash disad

#### Military bases are prioritizing community integration now --- Plan sends critical signal of isolation to both local community and base officials

Parthemore and Rogers, 10

Christine Parthemore, Will Rogers, Center New American Security, 5/20, http://www.cnas.org/node/4502-http://www.cnas.org/node/4502

Are small nuclear reactors a smart choice for increasing energy security and reducing greenhouse gas emissions at federal government facilities? In recent months this has become a hot question in particular at domestic U.S. military installations, which must meet unique energy needs while reducing their carbon footprints. Now, it appears that this question is taking Capitol Hill by storm as well. The media have reported that Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) is proposing a joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense demonstration project to examine the use of small reactors on federal sites. For some Department of Energy sites, such as Oak Ridge National Lab in Alexander’s home state — a site certainly accustomed to housing nuclear technology — demonstrating new nuclear reactor technology is largely a no-brainer. However, using nuclear reactors to power the nation’s defense installations warrants deeper consideration. Proponents of boosting this carbon-free energy source on military bases argue that these installations have unique capacities that would ease concerns over its use, namely more gates and more armed guards already on base 24/7. Likewise, the U.S. military services have unique energy security needs. Consistent energy supplies are a critical component of America’s ability to train at home and to operate globally. Energy is so important that some analysts are even exploring “islanding” the energy systems on some military installations to reduce vulnerabilities related to their reliance on often brittle domestic electric grids. Consideration of nuclear energy as part of these islanding concepts is on the rise. On the other hand, opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary. In most cases, additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns. Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities. Any legislation to consider the option of small nuclear reactors on military bases must include examination of these important concerns.

#### Plan causes local community backlash - Even aff advocates admit the link is true and highly likely

Andres and Breetz 11

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf

Small reactors used on domestic military bases are likely to face a number of additional siting hurdles. As a distributed energy source, they are likely to face substantial “not-in-my-backyard” battles. Moreover, dispersing a large number of reactors leads to questions about longterm nuclear waste disposal.27 Arguably, reactors should be relatively safe on domestic military installations, certainly more secure than, for instance, the reactors situated in developing countries or intended for processing tar sands. Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple. Institutional and technical uncertainties—such as the security of sealed modules, the potential and unintended social and environmental consequences, or the design of reliable safeguards—make dispersing reactors across the country challenging. Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors, and determining whether Permissive Action Links technology could be used to safeguard them.

#### Impact --- Military community relations key to prevent base closures and ensure readiness

\*\*\*only read blue if there is econ adv in 1ac

OPR 09 (Governor’s Office of Planning & Research – State of California, December, Community and Military Compatibility Planning, <http://opr.ca.gov/docs/Military_GPG_Supplement.pdf>, jj)

The Department of Defense (DoD) has a significant presence in the State of California. The military has made many economic and technological investments including large investments in land and military installations. The State has a strategic location, unique landscape and valuable resources that help further military readiness for actions around the globe. The state’s unique resources and the military’s investments have fostered a strong partnership between the two parties. This partnership and collaboration is vital for economic, resource management, and military readiness reasons. The economies of local communities, as well as the state, are impacted by the militaries presence and California plays an integral role in national security. The burden of maintaining this partnership often falls on the shoulders of cities and counties. In addition to juggling the competing demands of expanding development, promoting economic development and upholding environmental quality standards, local governments must also consider the needs of local military installations in their land use planning. Traditionally military installations were strategically located in underdeveloped areas so as to avoid land use conflicts. As the population of the state continues to grow and the land use needs of communities continue to expand outward, the need for stronger relationships and communication between local governments and the military is needed. Without adequate communication and coordinated land-use efforts, military missions, quality of life and public safety are increasingly jeopardized.

III. Base Closure and Realignment

Growth encroaching a military installation so as to hinder its mission can contribute to the installation’s closure. Under the Defense Base Closure and Alignment Act of 1990 (PL 101-510), as amended through FY 2005 Authorization Act, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission authorized base closures throughout the country between the years of 1988-2005. Some locations that were identified for closure had been significantly impacted by surrounding development, and as a result, the military mission could no longer be carried out in full. Base closures can bring severe economic impacts, through direct and indirect job loss. The DoD offers financial and technical assistance for reuse planning efforts, but recovery from the economic loss can be slow and have long lasting effects. These effects are not exclusively economic. Local installations often act as community centers and social hubs, the loss owhich can also bring negative effects. Preventing base closure is possible if both the community and the installation work together.

**DA 3**

***Korea is the SMR leader now --- plan trades off and destroys their economy***

Christofer M. **Mowry**, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc., July 14, 20**11** Testimony Before the Energy & Water Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee United States Senate July 14, 2011, KEL

**Failing to move forward** with this program **will not stall the deployment of SMRs in the United States or world-wide, but will simply stymie the U.S. industry’s current early mover advantage in SMR technology and manufacturing leadership.** **Failure to fund an SMR cost-share program will ensure that foreign SMRs (like the South Korean SMART reactor) receive the manufacturing jobs and exporting benefits by selling to U.S. utility customers**. **At a time when we need to ensure** that public **policy promotes U.S. competitiveness in technology innovation and leadership**, **the SMR cost-share program is the conduit to maintain U.S. leadership and create the manufacturing base here instead of overseas**. Conversely, the sharing of risks and costs through public-private partnership will ultimately result in a return on investment to government by supporting nuclear technology which can compete in the market without government support or subsidy, while creating U.S. design, supply chain, construction, and operations jobs.

***Korean economic collapse ensures nuclear war***

**Green & Schrage 09** (Michael J. Green is senior advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and associate professor at Georgetown University. Steven P. Schrage is the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a former senior official with the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee. THE KOREA HERALD, March 27, 2009, Asia's strategic dangers from financial crisis, Lexis, jj)

Dangerous states: It is noteworthy that **North Korea**, Burma, and Iran **have** all **intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis**, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority, and sown potential discord. **With** Beijing worried about the potential impact of North Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and **leaders in** Japan and **South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, Pyongyang has grown increasingly boisterous about its claims to great power status as a** nuclear weapons **state**. The junta in Burma has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of ASEAN. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the P-3 (the United States, United Kingdom and France) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a policy tool. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Burma), but that may depend on how much authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people and face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to suggest either. A lot of evidence suggests these **dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their** asymmetrical advantages over the international system.

### DA 4

***Drop in oil demand causes Russian economic instability --- risks nuclear war***

**Miller 10**—assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma (Gregory D., April 2010, © Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly 33:2, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence,” http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr\_Miller.pdf)

**Russia is another** potential **danger spot because it is the only nuclear state**, at least for now, **that has significant revenue from the sale of oil, roughly** 8—**20 percent of its GDP**. Losing that income will have less dramatic effects on Russia than on many OPEC states more heavily reliant on oil sales, at least partly because of recent attempts to diversify the Russian economy. **Its economy**, however, **is still too fragile to handle a major drop in demand for oil**. **Given the existing tension between Russia and states such as Georgia and Ukraine, neither the United States nor Russia’s neighbors can afford the risk of a nuclear Russia suffering economic instability**.19

***Extinction***

**FILGER 2009** (Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

**In Russia** historically, **economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major** industrialized **economies**. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, **Medvedev and Putin**, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, **are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability**, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. **Should the Russian economy deteriorate** to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, **the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis**. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, **Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability** to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that **a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing** social and political **upheaval**. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. **During the years** Boris **Yeltsin ruled** Russia, **security forces** responsible for **guarding the** nation’s **nuclear arsenal went without pay** for months at a time, **leading to fears that** desperate **personnel would** illicitly **sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain?** It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

#### Energy independence causes retrenchment --- decimates heg

Steve LeVine is the author of The Oil and the Glory and a longtime foreign correspondent. 3-23-12, Foreign Policy, The Weekly Wrap -- March 23, 2012 [,](http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/23/the_weekly_wrap_march_23_2012m) <http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/23/the_weekly_wrap_march_23_2012>, jj

**A coming U.S. renaissance -- and an oil price crash**: Citibank's Ed Morse unloads a monster, 92-page report forecasting no less than a new American Industrial Revolution. This economic resurgence is carried on the back of low natural gas prices as far as the eye can see (pictured above, hydraulic fracturing in Pennsylvania), in addition to a shale-oil, oil-sands, deepwater-oil boom that makes the U.S. "the new Middle East." In line with other top analysts, notably Deutsche Bank, Morse forecasts a tight global market in the next few years, notwithstanding the U.S. abundance, with the suggestion that prices will be high as well. But nirvana will arrive by the end of the decade with the convergence of U.S. oil abundance and a burst of production from west and east Africa, the Gulf of Mexico, India and the Caspian Sea. By the 2020s, we will see maximum oil prices of $85 a barrel, Morse writes in a teaser at the Wall Street Journal. **There are** of course **potential geopolitical consequences**, Morse writes: It is unclear what **the** political **consequences** of this might be **in terms of American attitudes to continuing to play the various roles adopted since World War II -- guarantor of supply lanes globally, protector of main producer countries in the Middle East and elsewhere.** **A U.S. economy that is less vulnerable to oil disruptions, less dependent on oil imports and supportive of a stronger currency will inevitably play a central role globally.** But with such a turnaround in its energy dependence, it is questionable how arduously the U.S. government might want to play those traditional roles.

**DoD SMRs Solvency FL**

***DoD SMRs not viable till 2020 at the earliest --- too many hurdles***

**King 11** (Marcus King, Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team at Center for Naval Analyses, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, "Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations", March, <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf>)

**Finding specific sites for nuclear power plants on or near military installations will be challenging.** **There are many considerations that affect whether a site is appropriate. Some of the considerations relate to safety and others to limiting risks of attack or sabotage, and still others to public opinion**. **Being located on a military installation** provides some advantages, but it also **imposes some constraints on how portions of the installation near the nuclear power plant can be used. Trade-offs will be required.**

**Designs for small reactors are at various levels of technological readiness and some are about to begin the NRC licensing process, but none have been licensed or constructed yet.** Consequently, **there are a number of unresolved certification, licensing, and regulatory issues**. **The size of the emergency planning zone that should surround the reactor is an example of such an issue. Resolving these issues will take time and resources**. NRC representatives have indicated that **they expect these issues could be resolved by the middle of the decade and that a plant could be built and operating by about 2020.**

**DoD Advantage Frontline**

***( ) SMRs hurt readiness --- putting a nuclear power plant on a military installation hampers land and airspace use nearby***

**King 11** (Marcus King, Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team at Center for Naval Analyses, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, "Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations", March, <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf>)

**There are liabilities to having a nuclear power plant located on a military installation**. First, **the military installation must find and give up all other use of a small area where the site is to be built.** **The site would need to be “not too near” to certain types of facilities. For example, not too near a hospital and not too near a facility that stores and handles explosives. Finding a specific site on an installation that is appropriate and suitable may be difficult**. In addition, **having a nuclear power plant on a military installation would almost certainly impose some restrictions on how land and airspace in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear plant could be used thereafter.**

**A small nuclear plant providing power to a DoD installation could be located on non-military government controlled land or on private land near the military installation. This may make site security more complicated and would probably make the approval process more challenging**. This doesn't mean that siting on non-military government controlled land or private land shouldn't be considered; it means that such siting would need to be supported by clear and persuasive reasons.

***( ) DOD SMR procurement sends a global signal of impending U.S. military aggression—causes resentment against U.S. unilateralism***

Terrence P. **Smith 11**, program coordinator and research assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at the CSIS, February 16, 2011, "An Idea I Can Do Without: "Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations,"" <http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations>

**The report repeatedly emphasizes the point that “DOD’s “’first mover’ pursuit of small reactors could have a profound influence on the development of the industry**,” **and cautions that “if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.” The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking**. **Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it (or have it), is what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today. It is a mentality I think we should avoid.** I do not mean to say this report ignores the risks. In fact they explicitly say, “We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors.” For example it says, **Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors.** The report also points out that “from a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies of scale.” These issues, which were briefly mentioned, hardly seem like small potatoes. The reports answer to the issues raised: “making reliable projections about these reactors’ economic and technical performance while they are still on paper is a significant challenge,” and “Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple.” On the other hand, the report argues, “failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD.” “First, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries.” Yes these are important issue for a business stand, but I don’t find them to be the primary concern. **The reactors are purely for energy purposes, but in a world that seems to be growing tired of U.S. military intervention, the idea of ensuring our ability to do so through the proliferation of mobile nuclear reactors will hardly quell any hostile sentiment**. In addition, **it can only add fire to the “nuclear = good” flame**. **So, while even under best case scenario, the reactors are completely proliferation proof and pose no direct threat to the nonproliferation cause (ignoring the spreading of nuclear tech and knowledge in general), I have a tough time seeing how it helps.** The report concludes that the DoD “should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors.” Since the 1970s, the report says, “in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well.” For now, the plans for small nuclear reactors are “unfortunately,” for the most part, “caught between the drawing board and production.” **My point is, maybe that is where they should stay.**

***( ) Forward deployed SMRs invite attacks and theft ---turns heg***

**Andres and Breetz 11**

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf), jj

**Using the emerging technology at expeditionary locations carries far greater risks**. Besides the concerns outlined above, **forward located reactors could be subject to attack**. **Today, forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan are regularly subjected to mortar attacks**, suggesting that **reactors at such locations could make these bases *prime targets* for attack. Since** **forward bases are** also **subject to capture, any design proposal that envisions deployment at forward operating bases must incorporate contingency plans in the event that reactors fall into enemy hands.**

***\*\*Theft causes dirty bombs***

**Levy 11** (Edward Levy recently graduated with an MSc in Globalisation and Development from London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies. Climate Answers, 12-7-11, Small Modular Reactors: One component of a sustainable energy future? <http://climateanswers.info/2011/12/small-modular-reactors-one-component-of-a-sustainable-energy-future/>, jj)

Furthermore **SMRs**, though small, **still have enough radioactive material to pose a terrorist threat.** While design features go a long way in protecting against such incidents, it is ill-conceived to think that they would justify significantly less operations and security staff as an initially viable option because certain **aspects of SMR security are particularly uncertain**. For example, **SMRs’ size might make them** easier to guard. However, it could also be **easier to steal or sabotage reactors**, **especially if off-site refuelling is utilised along with reduced personnel details guarding operating sites and radioactive transports.**

***\*\*Extinction***

**Toon et al 7** – Owen B. Toon, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: <http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf>

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that **a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories**. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover**, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination**. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, **the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there.** Accordingly, **an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict.** Remarkably, **the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations** (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

***( ) Cell phones solve their communication args even if the grid goes down***

***( ) Grid is resilient and sustainable***

**Clark 12**, MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’12

(Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

**In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred** – trees shorted a power line and caused a

fault – **that had a cascading effect** and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis

2010). **This** singular occurrence **has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and**

**subject to severe disruption** through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars,

brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other catastrophic

events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the ***2003*** blackout, the worst in American¶ history at that time (Minkel 2008), ***is a worst case scenario*** and used as an example of the¶ fragility of the U.S. energy grid. ***This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context*¶ *of the robustness of the electrical grid.*¶** When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the¶ **intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command** Rear Admiral Samuel **Cox stated that an attack was**¶ **unlikely to succeed because of the “*huge amounts of resiliency built into the*** [electrical] ***system***¶ ***that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult***” (Capaccio 2012). **This optimistic view**¶ **is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural¶ catastrophes.** **Complex systems like the electrical grid** in the U.S. **are prone to failures and the**¶ **U.S. grid fails frequently.** Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always¶ present. **Power outages** that affect more than 50,000 people **have occurred steadily over the last**¶ **20 years** at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively¶ high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel¶ 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, **the effect is mitigated by policies**¶ **and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management** Assistance **Compact**, a legally binding¶ agreement **allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to** a **catastrophic**¶ disaster such as **power outages** following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev¶ 2009).¶ **The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly**, it is a large and complex system¶ supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010).¶ **Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes** that cause blackouts, ***the economy*** is¶ affected but ***does not collapse*** and **even after massive damage** like that caused by Hurricane¶ Katrina, ***national security is not affected*** because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis¶ 2010).¶ **Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern** in an increasingly electronic and¶ interconnected world. **Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security**¶ **challenge**” (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the¶ top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). **In response to the threat Congress is**¶ **crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security** (Brito and Watkins 2012) and **the Department of**¶ **Homeland Security budget** for cyber-security **has been significantly increased** (U.S. Senate¶ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

***( ) Their ev is terrible --- no reason Russia or China would go nuts if our grid went out. They’re not irrational.***

***( ) Squo solves—all bases have backups***

**Kwartin et. al 12** (Vice president of ICF International, consulting firm that partners with government and commercial clients to deliver professional services and technology solutions in the energy, environment, and infrastructure; health, social programs, and consumer/financial; and public safety and defense markets, Robert Kwartin, Sarah Alexander, Martin Anderson, Donald Clark, John Collins, Chris Lamson, Garrett Martin, Ryan Mayfield, Lindsay McAlpine, Daniel Moreno, Jeffrey Patterson, Craig Schultz, and Emily Stiever, "Solar Energy Development on Department of Defense Installations in the Mojave and Colorado Deserts", January, Pdf)

**The potential sources of on-site power generation are: 1) diesel generators tied to the existing microgrid** in the cantonment area, **2) remote third party owned solar not tied to microgrid, and 3) cantonment third party solar that is tied to the existing microgrid**. ***Most DoD facilities already have some level of emergency backup power that is supplied by diesel generators***. **Many of the installations also currently host third-party owned solar projects, either adjacent to the cantonment or in other areas, or have the technical and economic capability to do so**, as discussed in the Solar Potential Assessment chapter.

***( ) No fuel convoys internal link***

**Hargreaves 11** (Steve, CNN Money, "For the military clean energy saves lives", 8/17, <http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/17/technology/military_energy/index.htm>)

NEW YORK (CNNMoney) -- **One out of eight U.S. Army casualties in Iraq was the result of protecting fuel convoys**. **This statistic**, derived from an Army study looking at fuel convoys in Iraq from 2003 to 2007, **is a powerful incentive for the military to move away from oil and toward renewable energy, and *that's exactly what it's doing***. **From experimental solar-powered desert bases for the Marines to Navy robots that run on wave energy, the military is quickly becoming a leading buyer of cutting-edge renewable energy technology**. For the armed services, the benefits extend beyond reducing fuel convoy casualties. A fighting force that isn't restricted by the reach of a tanker truck or weighted down by heavy batteries is more nimble and, as a result, more lethal. **For renewable energy companies, the military is proving to be a vital customer, buying the latest in clean energy gadgets and encouraging private investment**. **The hope is the armed services can shepherd this technology to the point where it becomes commercially viable, much like it did a generation ago for GPS systems or the Internet.**

#### No hopes of solving their internal link – their all based on tech that doesn’t exist yet

***Military budgeting accounts for price spikes***

Jeff Siegel is the managing editor of Green Chip Stocks, March 4th 2011, http://commoditiesreporter.com/alternative-energy/pentagon-oil-prediction/ (BJN)

Based on the Pentagon’s latest fiscal 2012 budget, this means the Navy is already gearing up to spend another $900 million next year! You see, the Pentagon report that was recently sent to Congress plans on the price of oil coming in at $131 a barrel. Of course, the military has been preparing for these price hikes for some time now. The U.S. Navy already has a plan in place to ensure that half of all the energy it uses by 2020 comes from non-fossil fuel sources.

***Pentagon insulated – they get subsidized fuel***

Marcus Weisgerber, Defense News, April 7th 2011, http://www.tsjonline.com/story.php?F=6030207 (BJN)

The Defense Logistics Agency buys fuel for the military. The services are insulated from price swings and market volatility because they pay a standard price for the fuel, a DLA spokeswoman said. “The standard price is used as a cost-stabilizing tool for the Department of Defense by allowing the DoD agencies to budget for and pay the standard price rather than the market price during times of volatility in the global fuel market,” she said. “The standard price is reviewed and may be changed during the fiscal year to ensure that the defense working capital fund, which is used by DLA to purchase the fuel, remains solvent.”

#### No impact to resource wars – spurs cooperation, not war

Bennett and Nordstrom, 2K – department of political science at Penn State   
(D Scott and Timothy, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44:1, “Foreign policy substitutability and internal economic problems in enduring rivalries”, ProQuest)

Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a "guns versus butter" world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States.

#### Forward deployment not key to heg

Sapolsky et al. 09 (Harvey M. Sapolsky is a professor of public policy and organization at MIT. Benjamin H.

Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at Cato Institute.

Eugene Gholz is an associate professor of public affairs at the University of Texas at

Austin. Daryl G. Press is an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College.

Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty, WORLD AFF. J., Fall 2009, at 84, 89-90, online, jj)

The United States would be better off pursuing a different grand strategy, one that would regain the advantages of our geography and accustom our friends once again to carrying the responsibility for their own security. Though we are the globe’s strongest nation—with a very powerful military, the world’s largest economy, and an enticing culture—we have neither the need nor the resources to manage everyone else’s security. We can meet the challenges of globalization and terrorism without being the self-appointed and self-financed global police force.

Restraint would offer the opportunity to reinvigorate the foundations of America’s strength. Foreign distractions, among other causes, have led the United States to neglect its transportation infrastructure, its educational system, its finances, and its technology base. If we were to restrain the global interventionism that has become our second nature since the end of World War II, we could ensure our safety while preserving our power to deal more precisely with threats that may materialize in an uncertain future.

The first virtue of a restraint strategy is that it husbands American power. It acknowledges both America’s great strengths—a combination of human and physical resources unmatched in the world—and the limitations of our power, which is easily dissipated in wasteful attempts to manage global security.

No nation or ideology now menaces American security in the same ways or to the same degree that the Soviet Union and Communism did during the Cold War. Instead, a variety of ethnic, religious, and nationalistic conflicts oceans away from us now obsess our policymakers, even though those conflicts have little to no prospect of spreading our way. To be sure, radical Islamists have attacked Americans at home and abroad, and while these attackers should be hunted down, they do not pose an existential threat, only a difficult and distracting one. Killing or capturing the criminals who attack Americans makes sense; trying to fix the failed states they call home is hopeless and unnecessary. The United States is safer than ever. The challenge now is staying safe.

The U.S. military is supposed to stand between America and hostile nations, but its forward deployment actually puts our forces between others and their own enemies. Alliances once meant to hold a coalition together against a common foe now protect foreign nations from adversaries that in most cases have no direct dispute with the United States. Although our allies are capable of fending for themselves, the fact that they can take shelter under an American umbrella allows them to defer taking responsibility for their own security. The United States should now use tough love to get our allies off our security dole. We need to do less so others will do more.

Restraint should not be confused with pacifism. Calling for America to come home is different today than it was during the Cold War, when there was a world to lose. Today it is not a call for capitulation or disarmament, though it does provide an opportunity for force reductions. The restraint strategy requires a powerful, full-spectrum, and deployable military that invests heavily in technology and uses realistic training to improve capabilities and deter challenges. Restraint demands a military with a global reach that is sparingly used.

Similarly, restraint is not isolationism. Isolation avoids economic and diplomatic engagement and eschews potential profits from the global economy and the enrichment that sharing ideas and cultures can offer. The United States would be foolish to decline these opportunities. Restraint does not mean retreating from history, but merely ending U.S. efforts to try to manage it. Restraint would rebalance global responsibilities among America and its allies, match our foreign objectives to our abilities, and put domestic needs first.

A strategy of restraint would treat alliances as a means, not an end. Alliances are a way of sharing the price of working toward strategic goals. Three conditions should be met for the United States to enter—or retain—an alliance.

• Does the potential partner need American help? If it has not tried to manage a given situation with its own resources or regional partners, then the United States should demur.

• Secondly, is it in America’s immediate interest to help, or alternatively, does the partner especially deserve American help? The United States should continue to work closely with countries with whom it has a special relationship or to whom it owes a special debt, in addition to those countries with which the United States shares a pressing strategic dilemma or opportunity.

• Finally, can the United States constructively engage or intervene? U.S. assistance only makes sense when practical actions are likely to improve the situation. Because preserving alliances is not itself an important goal of the restraint strategy, no alliance should be permanent.

As global threats and opportunities evolve, American alliances should also evolve. More broadly, the United States should recognize a variety of positive relationships with other countries beyond the special category of ally. A policy of restraint means cooperating with other countries at a less intense level through ad hoc coalitions, friendly diplomatic engagement, trade agreements, cultural exchanges, and other means.

Policymakers should consider both the opportunities and the costs of alliances. Alliances are like off-balance-sheet liabilities whose risks only show up as costs on the rare occasions when the alliances get involved in high-profile crises and conflicts. Under the current dispensation, we often extend guarantees to our allies without considering the huge payouts.

Alliances are costly for another reason. They cause us to spread our military assets around the world, giving potential enemies U.S. targets in their own backyards rather than forcing them to pay the price of attacking the United States by crossing the oceans that separate us from them.

Moreover, policymakers generally ignore the investments alliances require in a larger U.S. force structure. In the past, politicians have often explained that America’s partners help pay the cost of basing the American military—a proposition that was always questionable but is certainly not true today as American forces shift to Eastern European, Middle Eastern, and Central Asian bases. American taxpayers often pay for basing rights rather than being paid for the military shield they provide our allies. (Even when Japan and Germany shared the burden of paying for Cold War bases, the United States paid full cost to train, equip, and develop the power-projection forces suited to America’s established, long-term alliance commitments.)

Under a strategy of restraint, the United States would stop giving away American support. During the Cold War, interventionists could credibly argue that the vulnerability of allies was a direct threat to the United States, so we could not, for instance, afford to gamble that West Germany would resist Soviet blandishments if America’s military shield was diminished or withdrawn altogether. Because everyone knew that we would ultimately come to the defense of a crucial ally, no matter how disloyal its diplomatic behavior or how small its defense investment, the United States was often hogtied in its alliances. Today, our own security is not so inseparably linked to that of our allies; the threats they face are less severe than in the Cold War, and they can afford to defend themselves.

### Warming FL

#### 1) Text: The United States federal government should establish a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions in the United States.

#### Targeting specific industries and technology fails---cap and trade is key to market-based solutions that solve the case better

Morris et al 12 Adele C. Morris, Fellow and Deputy Director of the. Climate and Energy Economics project at Brookings, Pietro S. Nivola, Charles Schultze, Brookings Scholars, "CLEAN ENERGY:REVISITING THE CHALLENGES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY" June 4 www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/04%20clean%20energy%20morris%20nivola%20schultze/04\_clean\_energy\_morris\_nivola\_schultze.pdf

Public investments of these magnitudes, targeted at specific industries, arguably constitute an industrial policy, albeit a sectoral one, unlike the earlier proposals of the 1980's —that is, a government strategy to steer resources toward select producers or technologies. The rationale and efficacy of these clean-energy expenditures call for scrutiny.

Proponents offer numerous reasons for scaling up particular energy technologies at the taxpayer's expense. One set of reasons involves the need to remediate market failures that have not been corrected by other policies. For example, clean-energy technologies are said to emit fewer greenhouse gases than do traditional sources per unit of energy produced. The United States does not have an economy-wide policy to control greenhouse gases, most notably, one that puts a price on C02 that reflects the environmental harm associated with use of fossil fuels.

A far more effective policy than subsidies for clean energy research, development and demonstration would be a tax or a cap-and-trade regime that would put an appropriate price on carbon and other greenhouse gases. Properly implemented, this alternative approach would help level the playing field for greener energy sources, for it would require emitters to pay prices that reflect the costs their emissions impose on society. The enhanced efficiency that would result has been widely recognized by economists.6 True costs would flow to purchasers of goods and services that require energy, suitably inducing conservation. Emitters would have incentives to invest in equipment and new production techniques, use alternative fuels, and seek other methods to reduce emissions. And America's innovators would channel their efforts into inventing, scaling up, and marketing competitive forms of clean energy. However, because existing market signals do not suffice to encourage climate-friendly technologies, carefully targeted federal funding seems warranted. But as we explain later, it is ironically only after incorporating the social costs of energy into market prices that many clean energy subsidies will succeed in deploying new technologies.

***Warming’s not real and no impact --- we’re in a period of global cooling***

**Star Tribune, March 19th, 2011** (“Jason Lewis: Climate change is natural, and we don’t have the data to predict it” <http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentary/118270544.html>, jj)

All in the name of a [**global warming theory**](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/gore-lecture_en.html) whose fundamental premise **looks weaker every day**. Not long ago, the [Heartland Institute asserted](http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/gleick/detail?entry_id=82761) that **NASA had "been artificially inflating U.S. temperatures by 0.15 degrees Celsius since the year 2000" and as a result erroneously reported that readings over the last decade "were warmer than the 1930s, when in fact the opposite was true**." Eventually, agency officials did recant 1998 as the hottest on U.S. record when the data were reanalyzed showing the pre-greenhouse-gas era year of 1934 to be slightly warmer. **Across the globe, the last few winters have been exceedingly harsh. China has endured its most severe winter in 100 years, snow has fallen in Baghdad, and the United Kingdom just suffered through its coldest December since 1683,** according to figures from the Met Office. **British astrophysicist** David **Whitehouse says that not only have temperatures leveled off since 1998, they may actually be cooling once again**. Of course, that doesn't mean it's so. In 1975, Newsweek cited the scientific consensus (heard that one before?) about the coming danger of global cooling. Temperatures had been declining since 1940 even as carbon dioxide levels rose. Regardless of who is correct, we would do well to remember that cold is far more calamitous for mankind than the purported 0.6 degrees Celsius rise in the last century. Besides, as a growing number of "[climate skeptics](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8694544.stm)" point out, **atmospheric variables tend to mitigate or reverse the effects of greenhouse gases**. By not accurately accounting for the "negative feedback" of water vapor, ocean currents, ozone, aerosols, volcanoes and, most important, solar output (as well as the diminishing effects of accumulated greenhouse gases) global-warming proponents allow themselves to sanctimoniously pronounce that, all things being equal, a rise in CO2 will elicit a rise in temperature. Of course, all things are never equal. And therein lies the problem. **The global-warming hysteria is based on computer models, not empirical data, because the records simply don't go back far enough**. If Climategate taught us anything, it's that **these models are subject to human manipulation.** The famous "hockey stick" graph showing rapid warming in the 20th century was thoroughly debunked by Canadian researchers even before the purloined e-mails showed how global warming researchers were desperately trying to "hide the decline" in temperatures. Which is not to say that the Earth doesn't warm at times and ice doesn't melt in the Arctic. **The Earth warms** (see the Medieval Warm Period), **then it cools** (see the Little Ice Age), **and then it warms and** ... well, **you get the picture**.

***SMRs don’t solve climate change***

**Makhijani and Boyd 10** (September, ARJUN MAKHIJANI, electrical and nuclear engineer who is President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research AND MICHELE BOYD, former director of the Safe Energy Program at Physicians for Social Responsibility, Small Modular Reactors No Solution for the Cost, Safety, and Waste Problems of Nuclear Power, www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/.../small-modular-reactors-no.pdf)

Efficiency and most renewable technologies are already cheaper than new large reactors**. The long time** — a decade or more — that **it will take to certify SMRs will do little or nothing to help with the global warming problem and will** actually **complicate current efforts underway**. For example, the current schedule for commercializing the above-ground sodium cooled reactor in Japan extends to 2050, making it irrelevant to addressing the climate problem. **Relying on assurances that SMRs will be cheap is contrary to the experi-ence** about economies of scale **and is likely to waste time and money, while creating new safety and proliferation risks, as well as new waste disposal problems.**

***Nuclear power produces no net energy – the difficulty of uranium extraction means CO2 emissions are the same***

**Caldicott, 6** – Founder and President of the Nuclear Policy Research Institute

(Helen, Nuclear Power is not the answer, pg. viii-ix)

**While currently the creation of nuclear electricity emits only one-third the amount of CO**2 **emitted from a similar-sized, conventional gas generator, this is a transitory statistic**. Over several decades, **as the concentration of available uranium ore declines, more fossil fuels will be required to extract the ore from less­ concentrated ore veins**. **Within ten to twenty years,** **nuclear reac­tors will produce no net energy because of the massive amounts of fossil fuel that will be necessary to mine and to enrich the remain­ing poor grades of uranium.** (The nuclear power industry contends that large quantities of uranium can be obtained by .reprocessing radioactive spent fuel. However, this process is extremely expen­sive; medically dangerous for nuclear workers, and releases large amounts of radioactive material into the air and water; it is there­fore not a pragmatic consideration.) By extension, **the operation of nuclear power plants will then produce exactly the same amounts of greenhouse gases and air pollution as standard power plants.** Contrary to the nuclear industry claims, **smoothly running nuclear power plants are also not emission free**. Government regula­tions allow **nuclear plants "routinely**" to **emit hundreds of thousands of curies of radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every year.** Thousands of tons of solid radioactive waste are presently accumulating in the cooling pools beside the 103 operating nuclear plants in the United States and hundreds of others throughout the world. **This waste contains extremely toxic elements that will inevitably pollute the environment and human food chains, a legacy that will lead to epidemics of cancer, leukemia, and genetic disease in populations living near nuclear power plants or radioactive waste facilities for many generations to come.**

***Nuclear energy doesn’t solve warming --- too slow and doesn’t address all emissions***

**Squassoni ‘09**

Sharon Squassoni, Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, 12-10-09, Who's Right?: Climate Change Experts Debate Nuclear Energy <http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/10/who-s-right-climate-change-experts-debate-nuclear-energy/1lii>, jj

First, Squassoni questions the practicality of switching to nuclear energy. **Building sufficient nuclear capacity would take many years, while the need to reduce *g*reen*h*ouse *g*asses is immediate**, she says. She argues **the key to reducing energy consumption lies not just in replacing fuel but in improving energy efficiency.** **Switching to nuclear power would not immediately address emissions from other sources, such as cars, homes, businesses and industries.** While she agrees that a sense of panic won’t speed the process of replacing fossil fuels with nuclear power, Squassoni believes **the climate change issue is urgent enough to require faster solutions —** the leaders of the G8 countries have set 2015 as the year when carbon dioxide emissions cannot rise any higher. She also argues that **private financial investors have shown little interest in funding the high cost of nuclear plants and are more focused on smaller renewable projects that offer a faster return**. In addition, the hazards of nuclear waste and the possible proliferation of nuclear fuel for weapons are major concerns. **Efficiency**, she says, **is the fastest and safest way to reduce emissions.** Finally, **even if the world had 30 years to bring carbon dioxide emissions down, immediate action still would be the most methodical and logical approach**, Squassoni argues. **Since free markets favor coal as the cheapest energy source, governments still would have to act as soon as possible to make fast and low-cost changes that offer the least overall risk.** **Energy efficiency is not an abstract concept, but one that consumers easily can see in homes and offices. Ways to use less energy are not hard to find and are the fastest routes to reducing emissions.** Also, **using a mix of energy sources is better than relying on a single source, such as nuclear power**. Even if **nuclear energy** is included in the mechanism that rewards developed countries for investing in clean technologies in developing countries, it likely **would be too expensive even for the wealthiest of developed countries.**

***No Impact to warming***

**Goklany 2012** [Indur, Indur M. Goklany is a science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior, where he holds the position of Assistant Director of Programs, Science and Technology Policy. He has represented the United States at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and during the negotiations that led to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. He was a rapporteur for the Resource Use and Management Subgroup of Working Group III of the IPCC First Assessment Report in 1990, Economic Development in Developing Countries: Advancing Human Well‐Being and the Capacity to Adapt to Global Warming, <http://books.google.com/books?id=vO2ppGUrkEgC&pg=PA1&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q=157&f=false>] Awirth

Although the IPCC notes that **sustainable development “can reduce vulnerability to climate change**, and climate change could impede nations’ abilities to achieve sustainable development pathways” (IPCC 2007: 20), **many proponents of greenhouse gas controls** on the other hand, **dwell on the** latter (**downside**) aspect **of** economic **development while** generally **ignoring the upside** (e.g., Freeman and Guzman 2009). Here I will examine whether global warming hinders sustainable development or whether sustainable development makes it easier to cope with warming, and which effect, if any, is predominant? It is possible to answer these questions using results from the previously‐discussed Britishgovernment sponsored “Fast Track Assessments” (FTAs) of the global impacts of global warming (Parry et al. 2004; Arnell et al. 2002, 2004). The FTAs provide estimates of the contribution of global warming to the total populations‐at‐risk of malaria, hunger, and coastal flooding due to sea level rise for 2085. Goklany (2009a, 2009d), while recognizing that, realistically, 2085 is beyond the period that is reasonably foreseeable, converted these estimates of populations‐at‐ risk into mortality by comparing historical mortality estimates from the World Health Organization (for 1990, the base year) against FTA estimates of populations at‐ risk for that year. **The results indicate that under the IPCC’s warmest** (A1FI) **scenario**, which gives an increase in average global temperatures of 4°C between 1990 and 2085, **global warming would contribute no more than 13% of the total mortality from malaria,2 hunger and coastal flooding in 2085** (Goklany 2009a: 71). **The remaining 87% or more is due to non‐global warming related factors**. However, **had improvements in adaptive capacity been appropriately accounted for, the 87% contribution from the latter would have been much smaller, but then so would have the 13% share attributed to global warming** (probably by a like amount). **FTA results also indicate that:  By 2085, global warming *would reduce* the global population at risk of water shortages**, although some areas would see increases (Arnell 2004; see Goklany 2009a: 72–74).3 This finding is contrary to the erroneous impression conveyed by the IPCC’s AR4’s Work Group II Summary for Policy Makers (IPCC 2007) because that summary emphasizes the number of people that may experience an increase in water shortage but neglects to provide corresponding estimates for the number that would see a reduction in water shortage (Goklany 2007, 2009). However, the finding that the net population experiencing water shortage would be reduced is consistent with other studies of the global impact of global warming on water resources (Oki and Kanae 2006). Remarkably, this result is obtained despite the fact that Arnell (2004) does not allow for any adaptation and, consequently, advances in adaptive capacity that should logically occur under the IPCC scenarios!  **Partly due to increases in net primary productivity because of CO2 fertilization, the amount of habitat devoted to cropland would be halved by global warming under** the A1FI scenario, at least through 2100 (Goklany 2007b). Since diversion of habitat to cropland is perhaps the single largest threat to species and ecosystems (Goklany 1998; MEA 2005), **this means that global warming could actually reduce pressures on biodiversity** (Goklany 1998; 2005). Thus, at least through 2085–2100, GW may relieve some of the problems that some developing countries face currently (e.g., water shortage and habitat loss), while in other instances, **the contribution of GW to the overall problem** (e.g., cumulative mortality from malaria, hunger and coastal flooding) **would be substantially smaller than that of non‐GW related factors.** Notably, economic **development**, one of the fundamental drivers of GW, **would reduce mortality problems regardless of whether they are due to GW or non‐GW related factors**. Hence, ***lack of economic development would be a greater* problem than global warming**, at least through 2085–2100. This is consistent with Figure 7, which shows that notwithstanding global warming and despite egregiously overestimating the negative consequences of global warming, future net GDP per capita will be much higher than it is today under each scenario through at least 2200. Note that Figure 7 also shows that through 2200, notwithstanding global warming, net GDP per capita will be highest under the warmest scenario, and lowest under the poorest scenario (A2). **This suggests that if humanity has a choice of which development path it takes, it ought to strive to take the scenario that has the highest economic growth, whether or not that exacerbates global warming** (Goklany 2007c). The **additional** economic **development would** more than **offset the cost of *any warming***. No less important, it is far cheaper for the world to advance economic development than mitigate climate change by a meaningful amount (Goklany 2003, 2005, 2009d). **This is consistent with** the Tol et al. (2007) **analysis of various climate‐sensitive infectious diseases**. That analysis suggests that “[D]eaths will first increase, because of population growth and climate change, but then fall, because of development … As climate can only be changed with a substantial delay, development is the preferred strategy to reduce infectious diseases even if they are exacerbated by climate change. Development can … increase the capacity to cope with projected increases in infectious diseases over the medium to long term.” Thus, **it is most unlikely that under the IPCC’s warmest scenario, global warming will overwhelm economic development in developing countries**, notwithstanding the Stern Review’s upper bound damage estimates. Second, **economic development should be given priority over reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It would enable developing countries to cope not only with any negative impacts of climate change**, but more importantly, other larger problems that they will face (Goklany 2005, 2007b).

***Warming Is Not Anthropogenic – Multiple Natural Processes Subsume Human Impacts***

**Bast and Taylor 11** – \*CEO of the Heartland Institute, author of Rebuilding America’s Schools (1990), Why We Spend Too Much on Health Care (1992) Eco-Sanity: A Common-Sense Guide to Environmentalism (1994) Education & Capitalism (2003), Climate Change Reconsidered (2009), and The Patriot’s Toolbox (2010, rev. ed. 2011), \*\* managing editor of Environment & Climate News, Senior Fellow for The Heartland Institute, bachelors degree from Dartmouth College and law degree from the Syracuse University College of Law, (Joseph and James, “Global Warming: Not a Crisis,” The Heartland Institute, 8/2/11, http://heartland.org/ideas/global-warming-not-crisis) //PC

Natural or Man-Made? **The** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change **(IPCC),** an agency of the United Nations, **claims the warming that has occurred since the mid-twentieth century “is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations**” (IPCC, 2007). Many climate scientists disagree with the IPCC on this key issue. As Idso and Singer wrote in 2009, **The IPCC does not apply generally accepted methodologies to determine what fraction of current warming is natural, or how much is caused by the rise in** greenhouse gases (**GHG**). **A comparison of “fingerprints” from best available observations with the results of state-of-the-art GHG models leads to the conclusion that the (human-caused) GHG contribution is minor. This fingerprint evidence, though available, was ignored by the IPCC. The IPCC continues to undervalue the overwhelming evidence that**, on decadal and century-long time scales, **the Sun and associated atmospheric cloud effects are responsible for much of past climate change. It is** therefore **highly likely that the Sun is also a major cause of twentieth-century warming, with anthropogenic GHG making only a minor contribution**. In addition, the IPCC ignores, or addresses imperfectly, other science issues that call for discussion and explanation (Idso and Singer, 2009). Scientists who study the issue say it is impossible to tell if the recent small warming trend is natural, a continuation of the planet’s recovery from the more recent “Little Ice Age,” or unnatural, the result of human greenhouse gas emissions. **Thousands of peer-reviewed articles point to natural sources of climate variability that could explain some or even all of the warming in the second half of the twentieth century** (Idso and Singer, 2009). S. Fred Singer and Dennis Avery **documented natural climate cycles of approximately 1,500 years going back hundreds of thousands of years** (Singer and Avery, second edition 2008). It is clear from climate records that **the Earth was warmer than it is now in recorded human history, before man-made greenhouse gas emissions could have been the cause.** We know enough about how the Earth’s climate works to know that biological and physical processes remove CO2 from the atmosphere at a faster rate when concentration levels are higher and release more heat into space when temperatures rise. These feedback factors and radiative forcings are poorly modeled or missing from the computer models that alarmists use to make their forecasts. The arguments are complex, but the debate over natural versus man-made climate change is unquestionably still ongoing. The more we learn, the less likely it becomes that human greenhouse gas emissions can explain more than a small amount of the climate change we witness.

# 2NC

## DA

### 2nc overview

#### Strong relations with local communities are key to heg --- extend OPR --- lack of collaboration causes land use conflicts that jeopardize key missions and readiness --- absent cooperation these disputes escalate and cause base closures --- crushing power projection

#### Relations key to resolve encroachment issues --- vital to readiness and combat effectiveness

ICMA 06 (ICMA International City/County Management Association, NACo National Association of Counties, Working With Local Governments: A Practical Guide for Installations, <http://www.fedcenter.gov/_kd/Items/actions.cfm?action=Show&item_id=6203&destination=ShowItem>, jj)

The Implications

The U.S. military is responsible for protecting the American people and U.S. interests around the world. To maintain the country’s premier military edge, troops must have the best and most realistic training and preparation for the challenges of combat before they go to war. Restrictions caused by increased growth and development can have a detrimental impact on the military’s ability to “train as we fight.” If trainees receive restricted or inadequate training, they are more likely to misunderstand combat strategies and tactics, leading to poor skills and unsafe practices on the battlefield.

State and local governments have responsibility for managing urban growth and development through their land use management authorities. Land trusts, the agriculture community, and conservation organizations can leverage their respective interests in open space conservation areas and work cooperatively with the military to establish compatible land use buffer areas around DoD lands. Working collaboratively, the military, state and local governments, and other stakeholder groups can protect military training capabilities while conserving important natural resources and maintaining community well-being.

#### Triggers unique backlash in California

Paul Joskow, 2006 \* Elizabeth and James Kim an Professor of Economics al the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Director. MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/publications/workingpapers/2006-019.pdf

There are other potential institutional barriers to a significant growth in new nuclear capacity that need to be taken into account. First, the unsettled state of electricity sector restructuring and deregulation (Joskow 2006a) suggests to me that it is unlikely that we will see much if any investment in new nuclear capacity in states that have adopted competitive market models, at least until wholesale and retail market designs deal with design flaws that create general disincentives for investment in new generating capacity (Joskow 2006b). Moreover, stabilizing wholesale and retail market designs so that investors can count on a clear, stable, and fair market environment will need to occur to support this type of investment. Second, potential investors in new nuclear plants will still have to deal with state and local regulatory authorities and potential resistance from anti-nuclear groups that have been quiet during the long hiatus in new nuclear plant construction. Historically, the greatest opposition to nuclear plants has been in the Northeast and the West Coast, especially California.19 Many of the states that have adopted competitive market models also happen to be located in these regions of the country.

#### California bases key to readiness – asia and pacific focus, unique support structures and geographic features

SCLC, 12

(Southern California Leadership Council was founded in 2005 as a non-partisan, non-profit, business-led public policy partnership of business and community leaders. The Leadership Council exerts strong leadership on issues of regional significance, providing a common voice on major public policies critical to economic vitality, job growth and quality of life in Southern California. The Leadership Council unites business and community leaders from throughout the seven-county region into one effective leadership organization whose membership includes three former California Governors and two dozen Presidents and CEO’s of top Southern California companies, org/business-retention-and-attraction-strategies-preserving-and-strengthening-californias-military-readiness-related-jobs-as-sequestration-brac-are-addressed/)

•California plays a vital role in defending our nation today and in preparing America for the threats of the future. •In a world in which the threat matrix is increasingly weighted toward Asia and the Pacific, and in which technology plays an increased role in effective defense, California’s national security role is greater now than in the past. •California offers the best combination of technology, industry and academia in support of military needs, today and in the future. •California provides the best opportunities for joint training and operations in the U. S. •California’s unique value lies in the interconnectedness and close proximity of its large un-encroached military desert lands and nearby mountainous terrain, the largest restricted airspace in the U. S. and extensive deepwater operating areas off its coast.[1]

#### Plan causes German backlash

Johnson 11 (Daniel Johnson is Editor of 'Standpoint', 5-30-11, The Telegraph, Why Germany said no to nuclear power, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/8546608/Why-Germany-said-no-to-nuclear-power.html>, jj)

Well, as so often happens to politicians, she has been forced to eat her words by political necessity. An irrational fear of nuclear energy runs deep in Germany, and electoral defeats for Chancellor Merkel's conservative coalition at the hands of the Greens have convinced her that it is no longer politically possible to hold the line. As Bismarck might also have said: saying no to nuclear technology may be unreal, but in Germany it is realpolitik.

The nuclear debate in Germany has always been about much more than the relative merits of different forms of power generation. The enduring influence of romanticism, the love of forests and the worship of nature all contribute to the highly charged atmosphere in which the issue is discussed. The Nazis knew how to tap into this nature mysticism, yet they also secretly pursued nuclear weapons – despite publicly dismissing the "Jewish" physics on which the technology was based.

Unlike Japan, Germany surrendered before atom bombs could be used against its cities, but during the Cold War the nation was divided by the Berlin Wall and Germans knew that their country was a potential nuclear battleground. American, British and French forces on German soil were equipped with nuclear weapons to deter a Warsaw Pact invasion. While Konrad Adenauer, West Germany's postwar leader, was desperate to join this nuclear club, his Nato allies only permitted Germany to possess nuclear power, on which the resurgent German economy rapidly became dependent for cheap energy.

At first, nuclear power was seen as peaceful, in contrast to nuclear weapons. But as anti-Americanism emerged on the German Left as a by-product of the 1968 student rebellions, so too did resistance to nuclear power as a symbol of capitalism, which was now equated with militarism.

In the mid-1970s, so-called citizens' initiatives began to organise protests at nuclear plants. Their symbol, a laughing sun with the slogan Atomkraft? Nein Danke ("Nuclear power? No thanks!"), appeared on stickers and T-shirts everywhere. Anti-nuclear protest was suddenly cool.

Hence by the late 1970s, German public opinion was turning against nuclear power. Belatedly, the far-Left leaders of the student movement capitalised on this popular cause to create the Greens, the world's first major environmentalist political party. The terrorism of the Baader Meinhof gang had turned out to be a dead end, but the politics of anti-nuclear protest had a lasting appeal to middle-class Germans. In the propaganda of the Greens, Nato Cruise and Pershing missiles stationed in Germany were indistinguishable from the plants that produced cheap electricity.

Then came Chernobyl. The meltdown of an antiquated Soviet reactor in 1986 caused such hysteria in Germany that the nuclear industry has never recovered, despite the fact that fears of radioactive clouds proved greatly exaggerated. Green politics gained new momentum: "Red-Green" coalitions of Social Democrats and Greens began to be formed in the German states and eventually, in 1998, Greens took office at federal level, too.

By this time climate change had taken over as the fashionable new cause for environmentalists, bringing with it the problem of how, without fossil fuels or nuclear power, energy supplies could be maintained. Despite its promise to close down all nuclear plants, the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens had no alternative policy, because "renewables" simply could not provide sufficient cheap, reliable energy. After Merkel took over in 2005 as leader of a coalition with the Social Democrats, she quietly reversed plans to phase out nuclear power. Even today, domestic nuclear plants supply about a quarter of all electricity in Germany.

Now, however, she has taken an irreversible decision to distance her Christian Democrats from a political association that is far more toxic than any nuclear fallout. In doing so, she has succumbed yet again to the hypocrisy that surrounds this issue in Germany.

Take Iran. For decades, German industry has assisted Iran's "peaceful" pursuit of nuclear power, even though it has been obvious that the Islamic Republic's aim was to develop nuclear weapons. The computers that ran the Iranian nuclear facilities until they were sabotaged by the Stuxnet virus were supplied by Siemens. At international conferences, Germany adopts a high-minded stance on nuclear proliferation as well as nuclear power, but in practice German exports take priority over the security of Israel and other neighbours of Iran.

Or take France. In public, President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel are diametrically opposed on the nuclear power issue. But in reality, her decision to get out of the nuclear power business means that France will be supplying a growing proportion of German energy needs over coming decades. Most Germans are either unaware of the fact that much of their energy is imported from French, Swiss or Polish nuclear plants, or they just don't care, as long as the reactors are sited far from their own back yards. Germany has become a nation of nuclear nimbys.

So should it matter to us if Germany chooses to impose unnecessary costs on its own industrial and domestic energy consumption? Germany is the largest economy in Europe and the European Union has a habit of imposing German prejudices on the rest of its member states. Enemies of nuclear energy will be emboldened to pressurise other governments, including our own, to follow the German lead.

Ironically, not all Greens share the conclusion the German government drew from Fukushima. Our own George Monbiot, a Green fundamentalist if ever there was one, has been persuaded to drop his opposition to nuclear power by the facts of the case. This is his logic: if an ageing nuclear plant, incompetently managed and with obsolete safeguards, is hit by one of the worst earthquakes in recent history, yet hardly anybody is killed, then we must conclude that nuclear power has a lot to be said for it.

Logic, however, had little to do with yesterday's announcement: realpolitik dictated the decision. The grandchildren of the Nazis, born long after the war, have made the fatal mistake of identifying evil with a particular technology, rather than with the human beings who make use of it.

Germany is one of the most admirable countries in the world, but Germans, like other nationalities, are not immune to irrational attitudes. Decent Germans have reason to worry about the fact that, according to a recent poll, nearly half of their compatriots express anti-Semitic opinions, such as that Israel is conducting a war of extermination against Palestinians, or that "Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era".

But Germans have no reason to fear nuclear power. Mrs Merkel's appeasement of nuclear hysteria is disturbing far beyond Germany's borders because it represents a capitulation to irrationalism by the leader of a nation that once led the world in science and technology. The land of Leibniz and Humboldt, of Goethe and Gauss, is now indulging the fantasies of cynical scaremongers.

#### Key to NATO, Afghanistan and turns heg

Coffey 12 (Luke Coffey is the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. 2-24-12 Shrinking America's Global Reach: U.S. Military Bases in Europe Remain Vital, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/us-military-bases-in-europe-remain-vital>, jj)

Show U.S. commitment to NATO and Euro-Atlantic security. The U.S. troop presence in Europe is the most visible sign of U.S. support to NATO. At a time when NATO is transforming for the 21st century, it needs American leadership and commitment.

Be honest and open with European allies. The Obama Administration needs to make decisions on U.S. troop reductions in Europe only after consulting with key European allies and with the broader NATO alliance.

Reward key U.S. allies with closer defense cooperation. Instead of reducing the numbers of U.S. military bases in Europe, the U.S. should be looking at the potential for establishing new bases—especially on the periphery of Europe and with allies who have been committed to Euro-Atlantic security, like Georgia.

The U.S. military presence in Europe deters American adversaries, strengthens allies, and protects U.S. interests. Whether it is preparing and deploying U.S. and allied troops for Afghanistan or responding to a humanitarian crisis in the region, the U.S. is able to project power and react to the unexpected because of its forward-based military capabilities in Europe. Reducing this capability will only make America weaker on the world stage.

### 2nc UQ – Community outreach/engagement now

#### Relations high --- extend Parthemore & Rogers --- the military is factoring in public opinion to its energy decisions now --- current infrastructure is integrated and cooperative

#### Military bases pursuing strong and collaborative local community relations now – this solves land encroachment issues which are vital to readiness – the plan causes backlash and reverses this

Boccuti, Faul and Gray, 12

Amanda Boccuti, GIS Support Analyst, Marstel-Day, LLC, providing analysis and GIS support for U.S. Marine Corps projects. Lauren Faul, Specializing in Strategic Communications Analyst, Marstel-Day, LLC, Her primary responsibilities entail the development of engagement plans for the U.S. Marine Corps which will provide them a framework to sustain the missions through community outreach and engagement. She has previously worked as a Communications Director on Capitol Hill and Congressional Liaison for the Marine Corps. Lauren Gray, Environmental Issues Researcher, Marstel-Day, LLC, offering research and analysis of environmental issues for encroachment control plans and communications, outreach and engagement strategies for the U.S. Marine Corps. Her primary focus areas include climate change effects and energy development, 5/21/12, http://engagingcities.com/article/establishing-creative-strategies-effective-engagement-between-military-installations-communi

Throughout the Nation’s history, military installations and ranges were historically established in undeveloped areas, except for those forts located to defend cities. Local communities developed near the installations for safety and economic reasons resulting in the installation being the up-to-that-point rural community’s primary economic engine. Routine communication between the installations and local communities were minimal because the installation was self-supporting and not subject to local laws and regulations. Communications were primarily social. Starting in the post-World War II era and accelerating as the 20th Century came to a close, installation-adjacent communities increased in both density and size – becoming less rural, more suburban or urban, and more economically diverse.

Military missions continue to evolve, incorporating new weapon platforms and training over larger areas and at all hours of the day and night. These changes in both surrounding communities and the installation missions have often lead to competing interests with respect to the economy, natural resource management, and land use. Military installations and local communities must, therefore, focus communication efforts on building partnerships to find mutually acceptable paths forward for resolving their competing interests. Developing collaborative relationships is imperative to turning otherwise conflicting interests into opportunities for mutually beneficial solutions. The nature of those interactions is defined by issue type, installation and community rapport, and available communication channels.

The four military services (i.e., Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force) have service-specific community engagement programs to develop partnerships; all four, however, conduct information sharing through the Public Affairs Office (PAO), which handles media and public relations. Three of the services – the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force – have established encroachment management policies that outline service responsibilities to establish, maintain, and sustain community relationships in order to reduce encroachment effects. This responsibility is usually assigned to a Community Plans and Liaison Office (CPLO) or an equivalent community planner. The CPLO and PAO work with their installation Commander to act as the military’s voice and point of engagement in the community through consistent messaging, establishing an installation presence in community forums, and planning community-engagement events and processes.

Though Department of Defense (DoD) mechanisms exist to develop community partnerships, mediating the different interests and priorities among military installations and their surrounding communities is a complex, nuanced process usually exercised by the services, through their installation leadership. Siting of renewable energy projects, environmental stewardship responsibilities, noise from training events, and other policy- and planning-related matters invoke difficult questions, such as: how can an installation and its surrounding communities concurrently pursue goals and development in a way that lead to mutual gain, obtaining threshold requirements and fair compromise? Finding interest nexuses and fostering an open, strong relationship in which those nexuses can be explored is key.

### 2NC Link – General Backlash Links/A2: Plan Popular

#### SMRs uniquely unpopular because they’re deployed closer to population centers

ITA, 11

Department Commerce, International Trade Administration, Feb, http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf-

One additional obstacle is beyond the scope of this report but could play a significant role in whether SMRs are commercially deployed: public opinion. To the extent that the smaller profile of SMRs results in their deployment closer to population centers, public opposition to their deployment might rise. Deployment at existing sites, or in industrial applications away from residential areas, however, might minimize the impact of public opinion. Education about the safety features of SMRs and nuclear reactors in general could also ameliorate this concern.

#### Wide variation in local opinion guarantee the link and spillover EVEN IF PUBLIC SUPPORT IS GENERALLY INCREASING – dod feasibility assessment concedes the disad comes first

King 11

Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy TeamLaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

DoD will have to take the views of stakeholders such as state and local governments into account when deciding whether to undertake, or participate in a nuclear power project. Governmental views at these levels vary considerably and may be shaped by public opinion. Public opinion is solicited and taken into consideration at several stages of the NRC licensing process. Although public views toward nuclear power are increasingly favorable, there is significant opposition within some segments of the population. Before undertaking a specific nuclear power project, it would be important for DoD to take public opinion into account and consider it in the context of broader military installation/community relations.

#### Even military officials concede the link is highly likely

Defense Communities 8-9 (Are the Services Considering Nuclear Energy? [http://www.defensecommunities.org/are-the-services-considering-nuclear-energy/#](http://www.defensecommunities.org/are-the-services-considering-nuclear-energy/), jj)

Monterey, Calif. — Without discounting the prospect that nuclear energy someday could become a feasible power source for military installations, the services’ installation chiefs said the technology is not yet ripe for renewable energy projects now under consideration. “We are not opposed, but the others are proven technologies,” Katherine Hammack, the Army’s assistant secretary for installations, energy and environment, said in response to a question during the ADC 2012 Annual Conference as to why the services were focusing only on wind, solar, geothermal and biomass as renewable energy sources. “Everything I’ve seen is in the bench test phase,” she said, adding that the Army is having discussions with the Energy Department about the use of nuclear energy. Terry Yonkers, the Air Force’s assistant secretary for installations, environment and logistics, listed the technology’s principal shortcomings at this point in time — the feasibility of small nuclear reactors has not yet been proven, a permitting process has not yet been developed and the economics are unclear. And “the community may not be ready yet,” he added.

### 2NC Local Participation Link/Spillover

#### Plan kills relations ---- they circumvent local community input and avoid prior transparent public risk assessment

Parthemore and Rogers, 10

Christine Parthemore, Will Rogers, Center New American Security, 5/20, http://www.cnas.org/node/4502-http://www.cnas.org/node/4502

We recommend that this examination should be initially led by a blue ribbon commission, led by the Department of Energy and including relevant DOD officials who have been examining this option. A blue ribbon commission, by conducting a thorough and transparent cost-benefit analysis and examining the interests of all key stakeholders, is a necessary first step in determining the viability of small nuclear reactors for federal facilities, and especially for military bases.

This commission would need to include a range of stakeholders and experts qualified — and trusted by the public — to design national policies that will address and balance these concerns (even if that entails not going down the path of installing nuclear reactors on military bases at a large scale). Academics, regulators, nuclear scientists, proliferation and waste safety experts, state officials, and the governmental and nongovernmental policy communities should all be represented. It should seek to consider the full expanse of relevant concerns, including what technologies or models are most appropriate, what locations would be ideal or off-limits, where the energy security needs are the highest (for example, at combatant command locations), and along what timeline nuclear generation would even come online.

The question of a proper policy approach to the issue of locating small nuclear reactors on bases is heating up, especially as energy and climate change are increasingly important topics of public debate. It is time to set the stage for a national conversation on the most appropriate path for this technology. Ensuring national security interests and a cleaner energy future demands no less.

### 2NC Yes Spillover – A2: Resilient

#### Individual infrastructure purchase decisions can swing the overall relationship

OMA, ’8 (San Antonio Office of Military Affaris, http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/CMPSOW.pdf-http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/CMPSOW.pdf\*\*)\*\*

Community – Military Partnership

SCOPE OF WORK

Background

I. APPROACH

In 2008 OMA introduced the Growth Management Plan (GMP) as one of the responses to the growth brought about by the 2005 BRAC. The GMP clearly characterized the relationship between the San Antonio community and the military as well as potential community challenges as communities adjust to the changing missions of San Antonio’s installations.

One of the points made clearly in the GMP was that coordinated growth management planning was only a component of successful military-civilian compatible and sustainable growth. A second component is the way in which individual decisions made by both communities and the military about infrastructure and services in which they invest impact the overall picture of military-civilian compatibility and sustainability. As state, local and defense budgets become more constrained, the implications of these decisions on the overall posture of communities and the military to partner with each other is impacted.

### A2: nuclear now

### A2: renewables link too

#### Renewables don’t link to NIMBY --- only the plan does

Ansolabehere, 7

Stephen Ansolabehere Elting R. Morison Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, March 26, 2007

The 2007 survey focused on additional attributes of power sources, including siting, waste management, and technology transfer. These problems have long discouraged support for nuclear power, but they present obstacles to the development of other fuels as well. How would you feel if a [type of facility] were built within 25 miles of our house? Strongly Oppose Oppose somewhat Support somewhat Strongly Support The survey presented respondents with several different sorts of facilities – a natural gas-fired power plant, a coal-fired power plant, a nuclear power plant, and a wind power facility (with 100 250-foot towers). We also described carbon capture and sequestration and asked If carbon dioxide were pumped deep under ground within 25 miles of your home, would you support such a facility? Table 5 summarizes the responses to these questions in 2007. The same questions were asked for coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants in 2002 and virtually the same pattern emerged. Public support for and opposition to such facilities varies greatly. Wind power generating facilities enjoy support of a strong majority of fully 75 percent of the sample. However, only wind seems to receive majority support. A bare majority opposes construction of a natural gas-powered electric power plan within 25 miles of their homes (53% against versus 46% for). Almost two-thirds oppose pumping carbon underground within 25 miles of their home (carbon capture and sequestration). Fully three fourths oppose construction of either a coal power plant or a nuclear power plant nearby, with the strongest opposition to a nuclear facility. Local opposition to coal and nuclear facilities is not just a problem of “not in my back yard.” These are among the least popular form of electricity generation period, and most people want to reduce their use. Opposition is especially intense, however, the closer facilities get to home. Wind power is relatively popular as a general matter and as a local development.

#### We control uniqueness – DoD is cooperating with German communities on renewables now

Clean Technica 12 (Clean Technica 4-23-12, US Military Cooperates in German Small Town Energy Revolution

<http://cleantechnica.com/2012/04/23/us-military-cooperates-in-german-small-town-energy-revolution/#246GcagmBL1iB0RX.99>, jj)

Successful Cooperation

In order to make a further step towards this 100% goal, the mayor approached the US Army authorities with a plan of putting a 1-MW solar PV plant on the roof of huge storage buildings inside the massive military base. The local American military authorities and the national German authorities responsible for affairs concerning foreign military bases soon approved the plan and the project was about to be build. At that point, the project was halted because it still required additional approval from the Pentagon itself. In March 2012, the project finally received the long-desired approval from Washington and will be operational in May or June of this year. “This is the first time the US Military approved the construction of a community owned solar power plant within one of their bases.” -Mayor Werner Energized by this success, the community of Bruchsmühlbach-Miesau is already planning its next project in cooperation with the US base. If everything works out as planed, the community will proceed to build a biogas cogeneration plant in 2012. This project will reduce the annual heating oil consumption of the “Miseau Army Depot” by up to 443,000 liters / 117,000 gallons.

## Case

**Ext – SMRs Hurt Readiness**

#### Won’t be built offsite or at remote location on base and if it is than it wouldn’t solve the advantage

King 11

Marcus King, Ph.D., Center for Naval Analyses Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy TeamLaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March 2011, Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.Military Installations, www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear Power on Military Installations D0023932 A5.pdf

The principal advantage to having a nuclear power plant located on a military installation is the contribution that location makes to plant security. Access to military installations is restricted, with fences, guards, and other security measures already in place to enforce the restrictions. Locating a small nuclear power plant on a military installation should require very little additional site security. If such a plant were built in a remote area of a base far away from other installation facilities then additional security would be needed to control access and conduct patrols; however, a remote location would likely be inconsistent with the objective for building the plant. For example, if the plant is being built to provide better energy assurance then it is better to locate it near the facilities that will consume the power.

#### Also proves solvency has a long timeframe --- it would take forever to find a suitable site for an SMR.

***SMR’s kill readiness:***

***A) Training exercises***

**King 11** (Marcus King, Project Director and Research Analyst for the Environment and Energy Team at Center for Naval Analyses, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, "Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations", March, <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf>)

**The key factor that DoD must consider in the siting of nuclear reactors is the potential impact on training and readiness**. **All reactors regulated by the NRC have designated exclusion areas. The exclusion area is the area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities, including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area**. The existence of an exclusion area would not necessarily prohibit military training. According to the NRC definition, This area may be traversed by a highway, railroad, or waterway, provided these are not so close to the facility as to interfere with normal operations of the facility and provided appropriate and effective arrangements are made to control traffic on the highway, railroad, or waterway, in case of emergency, to protect the public health and safety [48].

#### Effective training key to readiness and heg

ICMA 06 (ICMA International City/County Management Association, NACo National Association of Counties, Working With Local Governments: A Practical Guide for Installations, <http://www.fedcenter.gov/_kd/Items/actions.cfm?action=Show&item_id=6203&destination=ShowItem>, jj)

The U.S. military is responsible for protecting the American people and U.S. interests around the world. To maintain the country’s premier military edge, troops must have the best and most realistic training and preparation for the challenges of combat before they go to war. Restrictions caused by increased growth and development can have a detrimental impact on the military’s ability to “train as we fight.” If trainees receive restricted or inadequate training, they are more likely to misunderstand combat strategies and tactics, leading to poor skills and unsafe practices on the battlefield.

**Ext – Unilat Turn**

***Plan causes massive backlash against heg --- extend Smith --- blurs the distinction between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons which stokes fears of unilateral military intervention guaranteeing resentment and balancing. Procuring SMRs makes countries think the DoD is about to start a new round of invasions.***

***Nuclear tech has unique stigma --- causes host nation backlash --- also proves the links to our community relations disads***

**Causbie 12** (CADET HANSON CAUSBIE ’12, CO F3, WEST POINT, NEW YORK, 13 MARCH 2012, US Military Academy, DEPLOYABLE NUKES: THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE DEPLOYED ENVIRONMENT, online, jj)

**These challenges do not exist with the current power infrastructure**. Personnel are already trained to maintain generators with minimum security and safety requirements. Generators also do not require special transport as they are not considered as volatile and dangerous as their nuclear counterparts. Additionally, **the *stigma* associated with nuclear power does not exist with diesel power production**. **Education of the military population regarding the safety of nuclear power as well as our coalition partners is essential to successful use of this technology**. **While a host nation may not have an issue with diesel generators they may have concerns with the installation of a nuclear power facility on their own soil.**

***DoD SMRs don’t happen in a vacuum --- plan has key diplomatic implications --- it’s perceived internationally and freaks out allies and local populations***

**Xie 11** (Yanmei Xie, Platts Nucleonics Week, 6-30-11, Small reactors a hard sell for military, Lexis, jj)

**The cost-benefit calculation for energy supply changes dramatically at military bases in combat zones.** For example, to maintain bases in Afghanistan, the US military ships fuel from places like Russia and Turkey, said Roege. Not only is it expensive to transport the fuel, he said, "people are killed; forces are diverted from other tasks." Therefore, a high-density energy source that could replace batteries and diesel shipped from afar "would certainly have a clear benefit, in terms of the logistics to deliver the energy," Roege said. Given conditions at such forward operation bases, small nuclear reactors are the "best option" to meet the military's energy needs, said Farrell of Radix. That is the conclusion he reached after leading a study that began seven years ago under a contract by the US Army Research Laboratory. The study was conducted by BrookhavenTechnology Group, of which Farrell is president. Based on that conclusion, Brookhaven began to design a reactor that could be transported with the fuel sealed in the core so that the entire reactor could be removed "without changing fuel onsite," Farrell said. The reactor was named DEER, for deployable electric energy reactor. But **when the company presented its findings to the Army three years ago, it received mixed responses**. "**There were some who thought** it was a very good idea and could be handled and others who thought **it was just not appropriate for the Army to be thinking about nuclear at all**," Farrell said. Although "there continues to be strong interest" in nuclear power from the Army, he said, financial support for the project dried up three years ago. That was when Radix was formed to commercialize the DEER reactor concept and seek civilian investors and customers, Farrell said. Portable nuclear reactors make "a compelling case" for forward bases and the military would buy reactors under those conditions, said Roege, but "**there's a whole host of downstream cost-and-benefits that would need to considered." These include the expense of operating and securing the reactor and the consequences of an accident or it being captured by the enemy**, he said. In addition, **"somebody would look at the *diplomatic implications*" of running nuclear reactors in foreign, sometimes "hostile" countries**, Roege said.

***The U.S. is pursuing a grand strategy of multilateral legitimacy now—perception of a swing back toward unilateral military primacy collapses heg***

Kevin **Fujimoto 12**, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, "Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct," online: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11->

**The emergence of peer competitors**, not terrorism, **presents the greatest long-term threat to our national security**. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and non-hegemonic, its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict that argument. **With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the *U*nited *S*tates should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power**. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. **The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability** and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. **A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires** investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and **building legitimacy through multilateralism**. **The *U*nited *S*tates must build** capacity in the existing institutions and **alliances accepted globally as legitimate** representative bodies of the world's governments. **For true legitimacy, the *U*nited *S*tates must** support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to **avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon.** The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.11 Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate. **Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous administration: “preemptive war,** democratization, **and U.S. primacy of unilateralism**,”14 **which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide**. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order. **Investment in a liberal world order would** also **set the conditions for the *U*nited *S*tates to garner support from noncommitted regional powers** (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18 Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.20 Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, **the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership** in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, **the *U*nited *S*tates must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower**.

**Ext – Grid = Resilient**

***Prefer our evidence—grid is actively improving***

**Koerth-Baker**, science editor – Boing Boing, columnist – NYT Magazine, electric grid expert, 8/3/**’12**

(Maggie, “Blackout: What's wrong with the American grid,” <http://boingboing.net/2012/08/03/blackout-whats-wrong-with-t.html>)

But this is about more than mere bad luck. **The real causes of the 2003 blackout were fixable problems**, ***and*** the good news is that, since then, ***we’ve made great strides in fixing them.*** The bad news, say some grid experts, is that we’re still not doing a great job of preparing our electric infrastructure for the future.¶ Let’s get one thing out of the way right up front: **The North American electric grid is not one bad day away fro**m the kind of **catastrophic failures** we saw in India this week. I’ve heard a lot of people speculating on this, but the **folks who know the grid say that, while such a huge blackout is theoretically possible, it is** also ***extremely unlikely.*** As Clark **Gellings, a fellow at the Electric Power Research Institute put it, “An engineer will never say never,” but *you should definitely not*** ***assume*** anything resembling ***an imminent threat*** at that scale. Remember, the blackouts this week cut power to half of all Indian electricity customers. Even **the 2003 blackout**—the largest blackout in North America ever—**only affected about 15% of Americans.**¶ We don’t know yet what, exactly, caused the Indian blackouts, but there are several key differences between their grid and our grid. **India’s electricity is only weakly tied to the people who use it**, Gellings told me. Most of the power plants are in the far north. Most of the population is in the far south. **The power lines** linking the two **are neither robust nor numerous. That’s not a problem we have in North America.**¶ Likewise, **India has considerably more demand for electricity** than it has supply. **Even on a good day, there’s not enough electricity for all the people who want it**, said Jeff Dagle, an engineer with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Advanced Power and Energy Systems research group. “**They’re pushing their system** much harder, **to its limits**,” he said. “**If they have a problem, there’s less cushion to absorb it**. **Our system has rules that prevent us from dipping into our electric reserves** on a day-to-day basis. So ***we have reserve power for emergencies***.”

***Their ev is hype***

**Sorebo**, chief cybersecurity technologist and vice president – SAIC, consultant for the government and industry in cybersecurity and smart grid technology, MA – GW University, JD – Catholic U, 2/8/’10

(Gib, “The Many Shades of Project Grey Goose,” RSA Conference)

As I noted in my previous post about a recent 60 Minutes segment, we often rely on rumor and innuendo as the basis for **journalism in critical infrastructure**. If a current or former high-ranking public official says he heard something, then it must be true. Unfortunately, Project Grey Goose, whose stated objective was “to answer the question of whether there has been any successful hacker attacks against the power grid, both domestically and internationally,” **falls victim to** much of the same **fear, uncertainty, and doubt.** As in all media **reports**, there are factual bases for findings that ***exaggerated the true state of the electric grid.*** For example, **the**ir **statement that “90% of the** U.S. Department of Defense's (**DOD**) **most critical assets are entirely dependent on the bulk power grid” is presumably taken from a** Government Accountability Office (**GAO**) **report noting that 85 percent of critical DoD assets rely on commercial electric power.** However, **the “entirely dependent” statement *ignores the wide variety of backup generators that support these assets***, and while not adequate, are nonetheless ***a significant contribution to the reliability of critical DoD assets.*** So rather than sounding the alarm that military bases, for the most part, do not have their own power plants, a better response would have been to suggest that the military expand the use of backup generators and micro-grid technology to augment commercial power as **the GAO report** does. Of course, that **would not grab as many headlines.**

Similarly, the Grey Goose Report note that “[m]ost Grid asset owners and operators have been historically resistant to report cyber attacks against their networks as well as make the necessary investments to upgrade and secure their networks.” **While it may be true that incidents are underreported, the implication** that the electricity industry is deficient compared to other industrial sectors **is misleading or even wrong**. Most companies do not report security incidents unless legally required to or to mitigate the harm to their customers, and even then the evidence of an intrusion and theft of data had better be definitive. Lost laptops and backup tapes are one thing. You cannot say they are within your control if they go missing. However, **organizations in general have a horrible record of even detecting when a successful attack has occurred let alone what was taken.** Like many industries, **the electricity industry has struggled to pinpoint the source of many disruptions associated with their network infrastructure.** **More often than not, the problems were inadvertent and not malicious.** We can certainly do better, and with technologies like Smart Grid, we have to. However, calling out the electricity industry for failures that we’ve all been subjected to is not very productive.

The other statements made about the vulnerabilities in the electricity sector are misleading. While North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC CIP) still does not apply to many aspects of the electrical grid for a variety of jurisdictional reasons, where it does apply, it is not voluntary, as the many utilities subjected to rigorous and painful audits can attest. The process may not be perfect, but **utilities are being subjected to scrutiny.** Moreover, **anyone receiving stimulus grants** under the Department of Energy’s Smart Grid grant program **has to demonstrate a very rigorous approach to cyber security** through the entire implementation life cycle.

Finally, **the report cites a litany of vulnerabilities** discovered **in various Smart Grid devices** such as meters and perpetuates speculation about the potential impact on the grid without considering compensating security controls. **Nowhere does the report cite names of vulnerable vendors** **nor does it provide any information about whether these vulnerable products have actually been implemented. It’s like saying that tests on personal computers showed that they were vulnerable to attack without identifying the operating system or** the **applications** running on the device.

### Fuel

***No risk of oil cut off***

Jeff **Bergner** is a visiting professor at Christopher Newport University. He previously served as staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and assistant secretary of state. The Weekly Standard. Washington: Jun 22, 20**09**. Vol. 14, Iss. 38; pg. 25, 3 pgs, The 'Dependence on Foreign Oil' Canard, PROQUEST, jj

The United States imports a large share of its automobiles from Japan, its consumer goods from China, and certain specialty metals required for defense from African nations. **Is there something peculiarly dangerous about importing a large share of oil?** Is oil somehow different from other products or commodities? Let's examine the dangers of reliance on foreign-sourced energy one by one. **First, could foreign oil suppliers come together to raise oil prices rapidly and throw the U.S. economy into a tailspin?** We had this experience twice in the 1970s, in 1973-74 and 1978-79. But today the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (**OPEC) is constrained in its ability to raise world oil prices and likely will remain so**. OPEC countries currently produce only about 40 percent of the oil the world consumes. And **OPEC has been unable to impose perfect discipline even on its own members**. While the Middle East has more than 50 percent of proven reserves, oil is found in large quantities in Africa, Dhe North Sea, Russia, South America, Mexico, and North America. **The ability of oil-exporting nations in different regions, with differing governments, to cut production and raise prices has proven to be limited**. **Despite increasing U.S. dependence on foreign oil over the past three decades, only a small share of the ups and downs of world crude oil prices can be fairly attributed to cartel-like production decisions.** Indeed, a far more likely cause of a spike in gasoline prices would be a hurricane along the Gulf Coast disrupting domestic refining. If keeping gasoline affordable is our concern, we would be far better advised to expand refining capacity than to fret over imagined schemes of cartels that have long since lost their power to control markets. **Also unlikely is a politically motivated cutoff of crude oil imports**. The United States happily is not in the precarious position of, say, Georgia or even portions of Europe, which are highly dependent on Russian energy. There, political manipulation of supplies is a genuine national security problem. Even the threat of a cutoff of Russian energy is a significant matter for nations dependent on that single source. **Oil-exporting nations**, moreover, **are every bit as dependent for their stability on oil revenues as is the United States upon imported supplies. Their governments are unlikely to survive if oil revenues are suspended even temporarily**. We have seen a similar mutual dependence of supply and demand when it comes to foreign debt. Fears that China might "call in" its holdings of U.S. debt are wildly exaggerated, given China's own national interests.

**2NC / 1NR Heg Backline - Ext #3 – Military insulated**

***Here’s more evidence – the Pentagon is insulated and if prices did get too high Congress would pass supplemental spending***

Nathan Hodge, WSJ, December 30th 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/12/30/pentagon-keeps-eye-on-oil-prices/ (BJN)

In a statement, Pentagon spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin said current prices “will not affect current operations or internal fuel prices, because the department’s working capital fund can absorb some effects of price fluctuations.” But, Ms. Irwin added, “further market increases could become problematic.” Here’s how it could potentially be an issue: The Pentagon forecasts fuel prices one year in advance, based on data provided by the Office of Management and Budget. The department then fixes a standard composite fuel price for the fiscal year based on those projections. The price is supposed to insulate military operations from normal market price fluctuations. If prices surge unexpectedly, however, it could cut into operations and maintenance accounts – meaning the Pentagon might have to ask Congress for more money. That kind of price squeeze happened in 2008; and in fiscal year 2010, the Pentagon sought some supplemental funding to cover higher than anticipated fuel costs. Thus far, however, the military has been spared any impact from the current price increase. “So far this year, the military units are shielded from the effects of minor pricing fluctuation,” said Ms. Irwin.

#### Framing issue—we would never let oil prices cripple the army—we’d take oil from everywhere else before it impacts heg

Alic, former tech and science consultant – Office of Technology Assessment, adjunt professor – Johns Hopkins SAIS, ‘12

(John, “Defense Department Energy Innovation: Three Cases,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, March)

In any event, should serious bottlenecks in fuel supplies¶ appear, **the U**nited **S**tates **will be less vulnerable than** many¶ **other countries,** including major allies. The U.S. government¶ can expect to outbid competing customers, beginning with¶ poor countries totally dependent on imported oil and including¶ wealthy economies such as Japan that benefit from the U.S.¶ security umbrella. So long as there is fuel to buy (or commandeer,¶ in war), DoD will be better able to afford it than almost any other¶ customer**.** The armed forces have first claim on the Strategic¶ Petroleum Reserve. Household consumers and airlines have more¶ to fear from supply constrictions and price rises than DoD.

#### We’d tighten our belts --- the military would survive a shock --- and alternate fuels aren’t key anyway

Abramson et al. 7-5 (Larry – NPR, James Bartis of the RAND Corporation, REPRESENTATIVE MIKE CONAWAY, NPR, Military's Green Energy Criticized By Congress <http://www.npr.org/2012/07/05/156325905/militarys-green-energy-criticized-by-congress>, jj)

But Congressman Conaway doesn't buy that. As much as the military uses, he says it only consumes a small fraction of the eight million barrels the U.S. produces each day.

CONAWAY: You know, the scenario that, somehow, we need these boutique fuels in order to protect us from a strategic loss of crude oil, you know - we take care of the military needs first and the rest of the country would tighten its belt.

ABRAMSON: When James Bartis of the RAND Corporation studied the problem, he found little or no strategic advantage to bio-fuels.

JAMES BARTIS: You can't make alternative fuels in the battlefield. The military's big problem is not buying the fuel, but getting it to frontline units.

ABRAMSON: Even if the U.S. could produce enough alternative fuel, Bartis says it would be just as complicated to get it to a war zone as conventional fuels are. Bartis also questions whether producers will make exotic fuels if only the military is showing interest.

BARTIS: The national benefit only comes from them focusing on fuels that can meet the much, much larger civilian needs.

# 1NR

### \*\*RUSSIA A2: No Withdrawal – Other Interests in the Region

#### \*\*\*Energy independence guts heg --- extend Levine --- in today’s climate of budget-cutting and austerity, reduced vulnerability to shocks will result in retrenchment and less willingness to protect oil shipping lanes.

His only answer is heg leads to geopolitical pressure – that’s not responsive – our arg is no oil depdence means no heg because we don’t need to do things like protect sea lanes

#### \*\*Reduced vulnerability to price swings will make isolationism irresistible

Mouawad ‘12

JAD MOUAWAD, New York Times, 4-11-12, Fuel to Burn: Now What?, Lexis, jj

''The reduced vulnerability of North America -- and the world market -- to oil price spikes also has deep consequences geopolitically, including the reduced strategic importance to the U.S. of changes in oil- and natural gas-producing countries worldwide,'' Mr. Morse said in a recent 92-page report called Energy 2020. ''Pressures towards isolationism in the U.S. will likely grow, with consequences for global stability that can only just begin to become understood.''¶ ''The only thing that could stop this is politics -- environmentalists getting the upper hand over supply in the U.S., for instance,'' the report said.

#### We have a perception link --- even if US presence stays the same, energy independence causes China to compensate for expected US disengagement

Levi ‘12

Michael A. Levi, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment, Council on Foreign Relations, 5-1-12, The American Energy Boom, Seen From Abroad <http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/05/01/the-american-energy-boom-seen-from-abroad/>, jj

Take a recent chat with a well-connected Chinese individual. He told me that Beijing is concerned that the United States will start to neglect Middle East security and sea-lane protection if energy self-sufficiency becomes reality. That, of course, would cause problems for China, since it currently enjoys the benefits of those U.S. efforts for free. To the extent that Chinese leaders start taking steps to compensate for expected U.S. disengagement, those will have real consequences on the ground. The big thing to remember here is that much of this could happen regardless of what U.S. policymakers actually decide to do.

#### Even if we have other interests in the region, they don’t require military presence

Walker ‘12

Martin Walker, a senior scholar at the Wilson Center, is senior director of the Global Business Policy Council. His latest novel, The Crowded Grave, will be published by Knopf this summer.

The Wilson Quarterly. Washington: Summer 2012. Vol. 36, Iss. 3; pg. 36, 6 pgs, America's Edge, PROQUEST, jj

T he geopolitical implications of the frack gas revolution are significant. Self-sufficiency in energy transforms America's relationship with the Middle East and Saudi Arabia, whose priority in U.S. foreign policy is likely to decline significantly. The United States will maintain an interest in supporting Israel and constraining Iran. It will still hope that Iraq can achieve stability and prosperity through responsible government. But given the advances in military and other technologies and the proximity of the U.S. base in Diego Garcia, none of these interests require a costly military presence. Indeed, since the future principal customers for Saudi and Iranian oil and gas are likely to be India and China, Beijing and New Delhi may soon inherit the diplomatic and geopolitical complications of the region.

### Warming FL

***Here’s more ev***

**Green, ‘6**

[Jim, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, has an honours degree in public health and a PhD in science and technology studies for his doctoral thesis on the Lucas Heights research reactor debates, energyscience.org.au, “Nuclear power and climate change,” November, <http://www.energyscience.org.au/FS03%20Nucl%20Power%20Clmt%20Chng.pdf>]

**A temporary response: limited conventional uranium reserves A very large increase in nuclear output would run up against the problem of limited known conventional uranium reserves. According to the** Nuclear Energy Agency (**NEA) and** the International Atomic Energy Agency (**IAEA), the total known recoverable uranium reserves** – reasonably assured reserves and estimated additional reserves which can be extracted at a cost of less than US$80/kg – **amount to 3.5 million tones**.9 **At the current rate of usage** – 67,000 tonnes per year – **these reserves will last for just over 50 years.** Of course, the nuclear power industry will not come to an immediate halt once the known low-cost reserves have been exhausted. Other relatively high-grade, low-cost ores will be discovered, and lower-grade ores can be used. **The NEA and IAEA estimate the total of all conventional reserves to be about 14.4 million tones**.10 The OECD estimates that about 16 million tonnes of uranium are recoverable at costs less than US$260 per kilogram, including 12 million tonnes of “speculative resources”.11 **Uranium reserves in the range of 14-16 million tonnes would suffice for about 200 years at the current rate of consumption – but *significantly less if nuclear power is to expand to the extent that it makes anything more than a minor contribution to climate change abatement.*** Large amounts of uranium are also contained in ‘unconventional sources’ such as granite (4 parts per million), sedimentary rock (2 ppm) and seawater (up to 4000 million tonnes at 0.003 ppm).12 **It is doubtful whether uranium could be economically recovered from unconventional sources, and the extraction of uranium from such ultralowgrade ores *raises further concerns in relation to the amount of energy required to extract the uranium and the greenhouse emissions expended.***

**Biodiversity**

#### Bio-D massively decreasing right now – massive consensus and studies prove

**Knight ‘10** (Matthew, Cites the GBO and CBD: The GBO-3 is a landmark study in what is the U.N.'s International Year of Biodiversity and will play a key role in guiding the negotiations between world governments at the U.N. Biodiversity Summit in Nagoya, Japan in October 2010. The CBD -- an international treaty designed to sustain diversity of life on Earth -- was set up at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, May 10, “U.N. report: Eco-systems at 'tipping point'”, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/05/10/biodiversity.loss.report/index.html?eref=igoogle\_cnn)

The world's eco-systems are at risk of "rapid degradation and collapse" according to a new United Nations report. The third Global Biodiversity Outlook (GBO-3) published by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) warns that unless "swift, radical and creative action" is taken "massive further loss is increasingly likely." Ahmed Djoghlaf, executive secretary of the CBD said in a statement: "The news is not good. We continue to lose biodiversity at a rate never before seen in history." The U.N. warns several eco-systems including the Amazon rainforest, freshwater lakes and rivers and coral reefs are approaching a "tipping point" which, if reached, may see them never recover. The report says that **no government has completely met biodiversity targets that were first set out in 2002** -- the year of the first GBO report. Executive Director of the U.N. Environmental Program Achim Steiner said there were key economic reasons why governments had failed in this task. "Many economies remain blind to the huge value of the diversity ofanimals, plants and otherlife-forms and their role inhealthy and functioningeco-systems," Steiner said in a statement. Although many countries are beginning to factor in "natural capital," Steiner said that this needs "rapid and sustained scaling-up." **Despite increases in the size of protected land and coastal areas, biodiversity trends** reported in the GBO-3 **are almost entirely negative**. Vertebrate species fell by nearly one third between 1970 and 2006, natural habitats are in decline, genetic diversity of crops is falling and sixty breeds of livestock have become extinct since 2000. Nick Nuttall, a U.N. Environmental Program spokesman, said the cost of eco-systems degradation is huge. "In terms of land-use change, it's thought that the annual financial loss of services eco-systems provide -- water, storing carbon and soil stabilization -- is about &euro50 billion ($64 billion) a year," Nuttall told CNN. "If this continues we may well see by 2050 a cumulative loss of what you might call land-based natural capital of around &euro95 trillion ($121 trillion)," he said.

#### Ecosystems can recover

**Warrick ’97**

[Joby, Washington Post, Aug 29, “Diversity Is Not Enough to Ensure Hardy Ecosystems,” Lexis]

Ecologists have long maintained that diversity is one of nature's greatest strengths, but new research suggests that diversity alone does not guarantee strong ecosystems. In findings that could intensify the national debate over endangered species and habitat conservation, three new studies suggest that a greater abundance of plant and animal varieties does not always translate to better ecological health. At least equally important, the research found, are the types of species and how they function together. "Having a long list of Latin names isn't always better than a shorter list of Latin names," said Stanford University biologist Peter Vitousek, co-author of one of the studies published in the journal Science.   
Separate experiments in California, Minnesota and Sweden found that diversity often had little bearing on the performance of ecosystems -- at least as measured by the growth and health of native plants. In fact, the communities with the greatest biological richness were often the poorest when it came to productivity and the cycling of nutrients. One study compared plant life on 50 remote islands in northern Sweden that are prone to frequent wildfires from lightning strikes. Scientist David Wardle of Landcare Research in Lincoln, New Zealand, and colleagues at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, found that islands dominated by a few species of plants recovered more quickly than nearby islands with greater biological diversity. Similar findings were reported by University of Minnesota researchers who studied savannah grasses, and by Stanford's Vitousek and colleague David Hooper, who concluded that functional characteristics of plant species were more important than the number of varieties in determining how ecosystems performed. "In aiming to protect natural ecosystems, we cannot just manage for species variety alone," the Stanford researchers wrote. British plant ecologist J.P. Grime, in a commentary summarizing the research, said there is not yet "convincing evidence that species diversity and ecosystem function are consistently and causally related." "It could be argued," he added, "that the tide is turning against the notion of high biodiversity as a controller of ecosystem function and insurance against ecological collapse."

#### Won’t snowball

**Sagoff ’97**

[Mark, PEW Scholar in Conservation and the Environment, June, “Do We Consume Too Much?” Lexis]

There is no credible argument, moreover, that all or even most of the species we are concerned to protect are essential to the functioning of the ecological systems on which we depend. (If whales went extinct, for example, the seas would not fill up with krill.) David Ehrenfeld, a biologist at Rutgers University, makes this point in relation to the vast ecological changes we have already survived. "Even a mighty dominant like the American chestnut," Ehrenfeld has written, "extending over half a continent, all but disappeared without bringing the eastern deciduous forest down with it." Ehrenfeld points out that the species most likely to be endangered are those the biosphere is least likely to miss. "Many of these species were never common or ecologically influential; by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine."

#### Plan doesn’t solve alt causes to biod loss

**FERN 09**; (Forests and the European Union Resource Network, created by the World Rainforest Movement, <http://www.fern.org/pages/cbd/bioloss.html>)

The number of species on Earth has been variously estimated to be between 10 and 100 million, although only 1.7 million of them have been described so far. To date, the loss of biodiversity is greater that at any time in the past. Some 100 species are being lost every day. Even the most insignificant-seeming species can play a crucial role in the ecosystem to which it belongs. We simply do not know what we are throwing away. Forest ecosystems are among those facing the most severe biodiversity loss. Causes of biodiversity loss  The major direct causes of biodiversity loss are the fragmentation, degradation or loss of habitats; the over-exploitation of natural resources; pollution; the introduction of non-native (alien, or exotic) species and [climate change](http://www.fern.org/pages/climate/intro.html). Among the most important underlying causes of biodiversity loss are ill-fitted policies, undefined lands and resources rights, and the macro-economic context which affects both peoples and ecosystems alike. The CBD recognises that the conservation of biological diversity is an integral part of sustainable development and promotes the integration of environmental conservation with economic development, arguing that sustainable development is only possible if the earth's renewable resources are consumed in a sustainable way.